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This report chronicles the proceedings 
of the 2011 NATO Building Integrity 
Conference and places the discussions 
and findings into the overarching 
framework of the multi-year Building 
Integrity (BI) Initiative. 
The report document is laid out 
in a number of sections. First, a 
Backgrounder section introduces key 
BI objectives, themes, and projects. 
This overview defines terms, identifies 
partners, and highlights achievements 
so that the conference proceedings can 
be viewed in a larger context.
Subsequent sections focus on the 
conference proceedings. Summaries of 
the Welcoming Remarks and Keynote 
Addresses are followed by a synopsis 
of the special Expert Session that 
featured case studies presented by 
three sets of panelists.
The Plenary Sessions included the 
five panel discussions, and the report 
captures the major points made 
by the speakers. The results of the 
five Working Groups, which were 
developed by the members of each 
group, are also included. Details 
describing the next steps and the  
way ahead conclude the section. 
The final section includes references 
such as the conference agenda, 
abbreviations and acronyms, and 
frequently asked questions (FAQs). 
Liliana Serban, Director of the Research 
Department, NATO School, Germany, 
compiled information and edited the 
2011 NATO Building Integrity Conference 
Report. Matt Kovalick, Katie Kraning, 
Brian Maslowsky, and Cara Metell of 
the M.C. Dean, Inc. Global Engagement 
& Outreach (GEO) Group served as 
contributors and editors. Frank Chezem, 
consultant to the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS), designed the theme and 
laid out the Report. Photography by 
Javier Chagoya of NPS.  
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About this Event
Under the auspices of the Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council (EAPC), the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), the U.S. Office of the Secretary 
of Defense (OSD), and the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) in its 
capacity as the U.S. PfP Training and 
Education Center (PTC) co-sponsored 
the 2011 NATO Building Integrity 
Conference on February 23-25 in 
Monterey, California.
High-level participants represented 
public and private as well as military 
and civilian organizations from both 
NATO and partner countries. The 
seniority and diversity of the audience 
emphasized both the importance and 
multi-faceted nature of the effort to 
increase transparency and reduce the 
risk of corruption in the defense and 
security sector.
 Over 150 participants assembled to 
review the progress of the Building 
Integrity (BI) Initiative and to find ways 
to improve the implementation of the 
project further.
Organizers set out the following 
objectives for the conference:
• Take stock on progress to date and 
share best practices following the 
launch of Phase II (November 2010) 
• Develop strategies to mainstream BI 
into NATO mechanisms and sustain 
the Initiative
• Chart a path for dedicated Building 
Integrity support to the Afghan 
National Security Forces (ANSF)
The NPS Vice President and Provost 
welcomed participants to the 
conference. The first day, an Expert 
Session led by NPS and held in 
plenary, examined defense acquisition, 
procurement, and contracting 
though a series of presentations and 
discussions on different case studies, 
such as Afghanistan, and research 
methodologies used to support them. 
The expert panels focused primarily  
on Afghanistan. 
The second day began with the three 
keynote speakers who laid important 
groundwork for the proceedings over 
the remainder of the conference, 
including the Plenary Sessions that 
featured a series of panel discussions. 
In the afternoon of the second day, 
participants divided into five parallel 
working groups that explored more 
fully various aspects of the Initiative, 
including: development of BI  
Guidance and Doctrine for Education 
and Training (E&T); development of 
tools to measure change; the links 
between corruption and conflict; 
strengthening transparency in the 
Afghan National Security Forces 
(ANSF); and reducing the risk of 
corruption in operational contracting.
On the third day, representatives of 
major stakeholders, including NATO 
and Transparency International (TI) 
UK, tied together the many themes and 
summarized the groups’ findings in 
order to recommend the next steps.
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NATO - North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), an Alliance of 28 countries 
from North America and Europe is 
committed “to help promote common 
security” with its partners around 
the globe. 1  NATO will engage, where 
possible and when necessary, to 
prevent crises, manage crises, stabilize 
post-conflict situations, and support 
reconstruction. The lessons learned 
from NATO operations, in particular in 
Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, 
make it clear that a comprehensive 
political, civilian, and military approach 
is necessary for effective crisis 
management. 2  This new approach to 
security, which was the central piece 
of the 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit and 
established in the new NATO Strategic 
Concept, offers a broader framework for 
the Building Integrity (BI) Initiative.
Building Integrity 
Initiative
The Building Integrity Initiative was 
established in November 2007 by 
the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 
(EAPC), consisting of all NATO 
Member countries and numerous 
partner nations. The BI Initiative “seeks 
to raise awareness, promote good 
practice and provide practical tools to 
help nations build integrity and reduce 
risks of corruption in the security sector 
by strengthening transparency and 
accountability.” The Initiative and the 
practical tools made available through 
it are open to all NATO Member and 
partner countries. 3
U.S. Office of the 
Secretary of Defense
The U.S. Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD) is the principal staff 
element of the Secretary of Defense, 
Robert M. Gates, “in the exercise of 
policy development, planning, resource 
management, fiscal, and program 
evaluation responsibilities.” 4  It 
supports the U.S. approach in assisting 
partners’ efforts to reduce defense 
corruption that is based on the strength 
of partnerships, a comprehensive 
approach to Security Sector Reform 
(SSR), and a focus on enhancing 
defense institutions. 5 
Naval Postgraduate 
School, the U.S. 
Partnership for Peace 
Training and Education 
Center 
The mission of the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) is to provide “high-
quality, relevant and unique advanced 
education and research programs that 
increase the combat effectiveness of 
the Naval Services, other Armed Forces 
of the U.S. and its partners, to enhance 
the national security.” 6 
NPS is designated as the U.S. 
Partnership for Peace Training and 
Education Center (USPTC) by NATO. 
The USPTC is “one of twenty PTCs from 
participating NATO/partner countries 
recognized by NATO. It is part of the 
U.S. contribution to NATO’s effort 
to build a collaborative approach to 
training and education throughout 
NATO and partner nations. The USPTC 
supports NATO and partner objectives 
and serves as the diplomatic face of 
the Naval Postgraduate School with a 
primary mission of conflict prevention. 
The USPTC achieves this through the 
development of long-term strategic, 
partnership capacity building programs 
that meet the objectives of key 
stakeholders, the U.S. Department of 
Defense, and the U.S. Department  
of State.” 7   
Event Sponsors
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Executive Summary 
The 2011 Building Integrity Conference 
marked the transition to the Phase 
II of the Building Integrity Initiative 
and brought together Subject Matter 
Experts (SMEs) from national 
education and training institutions, 
business and industry, International 
Organizations (IOs) and Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs), 
and high level national and NATO 
decision-makers.
The conference agenda included a 
primary focus on ways to address 
corruption in Afghanistan. The 
proceedings were divided between 
discussions on defense acquisition, 
procurement, and contracting and 
also NATO’s support to BI. The 
conference covered a series of topics 
ranging from challenges posed by 
defense procurement in Afghanistan 
and Lessons Learned (LL) from 
other conflict environments, to 
research methodologies for assessing 
corruption, and the best anti-corruption 
practices developed by different 
countries, IOs, or NGOs.
During the course of events, 
participants met in five parallel working 
groups, which made the following 
specific recommendations on the need 
to further develop and implement the 
BI Initiative:
• BI Doctrine and Guidance – 
NATO is to determine the need to 
develop BI Guidance and Doctrine 
for Training and Education and 
integrate BI in all aspects of NATO 
capability development
• Measuring change - Continue 
the development of indicators 
for nations to measure change in 
building integrity in the defense/
security sector
• Research - Undertake research to 
support BI policy and programs, 
including research on the links 
between corruption and conflict 
and the impacts of corruption on 
military operations 
• BI in support of Afghanistan - 
Further develop BI support for 
strengthening transparency, 
accountability and capabilities in 
the Afghan National Security  
Forces (ANSF)
• Sharing Best Practices on 
Contracting - Increase levels of 
information sharing on contracting 
amongst officers from NATO/ISAF, 
nations, and organizations, as well 
as develop training at all levels to 
increase awareness of contracting 
related corruption
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NATO Building Integrity  
Backgrounder
Why develop a Building 
Integrity Initiative?
Building Integrity, strengthening 
transparency, increasing accountability, 
and reducing corruption risk are 
integral parts of NATO and the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) 
cooperation as highlighted in the 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) Framework 
Document and elaborated further 
in the Partnership Action Plan on 
Defense Institution Building (PAP-
DIB), endorsed at the NATO Istanbul 
Summit in 2004 and re-affirmed at the 
Bucharest Summit in 2008.
All nations are confronted with the 
challenge of long-term affordability 
and sustainability of defense and 
security expenditures. The demand to 
invest in new capabilities and to meet 
the challenges of ongoing operations 
is not new. However, all nations are 
under increasing pressure to make 
maximum effective use of limited 
funds and to demonstrate that they are 
accountable for the resources allocated 
for defense and security. In addition 
to wasting limited public resources 
and undermining public trust and 
confidence, corruption has a negative 
and corrosive impact on the ability to 
execute NATO-led operations. 
The Building Integrity Initiative, 
launched by the EAPC Ambassadors in 
November 2007, is aimed at developing 
practical tools to help nations reduce 
corruption risk in their defense 
establishments. Heads of State and 
Government noted the BI Initiative 
at the NATO Summits in Bucharest, 
Strasbourg–Kehl, and Lisbon. The BI 
Initiative is supported by voluntary 
contributions to a Trust Fund led by 
Norway, Poland, Switzerland, and the 
United Kingdom (UK). 
The practical tools and mechanisms 
developed through this Initiative 
constitute part of the Partnership Tool 
Kit and are aimed at helping nations to 
implement the obligations under the 
UN Convention against Corruption and 
to reduce the risk of corruption in the 
defense and security sector. 8
Implementing Partners
The BI Tool Kit and associated 
program of activities are implemented 
in close cooperation with a network 
of BI implementing Partners drawn 
from national authorities as well as 
civil society. These include national 
ministries and defense institutions, 
PfP Training and Education Centers 
(PTCs), academic institutions, as well 
as Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs), such as Geneva Centre 
for Security Policy (GCSP), Geneva 
Centre for Democratic Control 
of the Armed Forces (DCAF), 
Ministry of Defense (MOD) Bulgaria, 
MOD Norway, NATO School 
Oberammergau, Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS), PTC Turkey, United 
Kingdom Defence Academy (UKDA), 
Peace Dividend Trust, Peace 
Support Operations Training Centre 
(PSOTC) of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(BiH), Swedish National Defense 
College (NDC), and Transparency 
International (TI) UK. 
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Building Integrity  
Tool Kit 
The elements of the BI Tool Kit are set 
out below:
The BI Tool Kit - Phase I: 
• An Integrity Self Assessment Survey 
and Peer Review Process
• NATO BI Leadership Course, 
certified by Allied Command 
Transformation (ACT)
• A Building Integrity Compendium
• A Network of Implementing Partners
• Pool of BI Subject Matter  
Experts (SMEs) 
The Enhanced BI Tool Kit – Phase II 
• Specialized and advanced education 
packages including e-based tools
• Enhanced pool of Subject  
Matter Experts 
• Development of a Risk  
Assessment Tool
• Development of an “Integrity Index” 
to supplement the current Integrity 
Self Assessment Survey
• Development of an Integrity Pact  
for procurement
• Development of practical tools for 
nations contributing to NATO led 
operations, including support for 
implementing Afghan First Policy
• Continuing efforts to promote 
good practice; including areas such 
as ethics and business code of 
conduct, including principles for 
relations with suppliers 9
Achievements
The BI Initiative is focused on raising 
awareness; developing practical tools 
and mechanisms to transfer knowledge; 
promoting good practices; and building 
capacity. Education and professional 
development of people who work in 
defense and security establishments is 
a keystone of the BI Initiative. 
Main achievements to date include: 
• A NATO BI Leadership Course, 
certified by ACT. More than 400 civil 
and military personnel have taken 
part in the BI courses conducted in 
Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Ukraine, the UK, and the NATO 
School. This is the first NATO course 
to be developed and conducted 
in collaboration with an NGO - 
Transparency International  
(Defence Team, UK).
• Designation of the UK Defence 
Academy as a PTC for Governance 
and Leadership provides a focus 
for sustained BI education and 
professional development efforts.
• BI support to International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) pre-
deployment delivered by Joint Force 
Command (JFC), Brunssum. 
• An Integrity Self-Assessment Survey 
and Peer Review Process to map 
current practices and procedures 
in defense establishments. 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Norway, and Ukraine 
have completed the Integrity Self 
Assessment. In the case of Ukraine, 
all ministries and agencies reporting 
to the National Security and Defense 
Council have completed the BI 
survey. The completed survey results 
and peer review provide a framework 
for sharing experiences as well as 
developing national action plans and 
benchmarks. The text of the Integrity 
Self Assessment can be accessed 
from the NATO and Transparency 
International (TI) websites. 10
• The “Compendium of Best 
Practices in Building Integrity and 
Reducing Corruption in Defense” 
provides a strategic approach to 
reducing corruption risks. The 
Compendium focuses on the 
practicalities of designing and 
implementing integrity building 
programs in defense, taking account 
of the cultural specifics of defense 
organizations. The Compendium is 
available in English and Ukrainian; a 
Russian version is planned.
• A network of BI Implementing 
Partners has been established to 
develop and implement the BI Tool 
Kit and program of activities. The 
BI network is open to all members 
of the EAPC and includes national 
authorities, academic institutions, 
PTCs, as well as NGOs. 
Pictured left to right: Brig. Gen. Mohammad Awwad, Jordan-NATO Relations Director of 
International Affairs; Brig. Gen. Michael Jorgensen, NATO Allied Headquarters, Joint Forces 
Command, Brunssum; and WG Cdr. Alan Povey, NATO Allied Headquarters, Joint Forces 
Command, Brunssum.
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• A pool of BI SMEs drawn from 
national ministries, international 
organizations, as well as civil 
society takes an active role in the 
development and implementation 
of all aspects of the BI program. 
The SMEs play an important role 
particularly in raising awareness, 
supporting nations in their self-
assessment surveys, and conducting 
BI courses. 11
Building Integrity Support 
to Nations 
BI offers a tailored approach to each 
nation and the components of the BI 
Tool Kit may be used individually or 
in combination. Implementation is 
supported by the pool of SMEs who, 
on request, work closely with individual 
nations to develop a package to meet 
their specific needs. This includes 
helping nations:
• Survey current practices
• Develop action plans including 
timelines and benchmarks to 
measure change
• Identify education and professional 
development needs to build  
national capacity
• Identify and promote good practices
BI Support for Afghan 
National Security Forces 
Afghanistan has taken actively part 
in the BI program by hosting BI 
Leadership courses in Kabul, taking 
part in BI activities conducted in EAPC 
nations, and completing the BI Self 
Assessment Survey. A tailored multiyear 
BI Program for Afghanistan is currently 
being developed in the framework of 
the Enduring Partnership between 
NATO and the Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and in 
close co-operation with NATO Training 
Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A) /
Combined Security Transition 
Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A) 
(Anti-Corruption Office). The BI tools 
and mechanisms offered to support 
the ANSF are the same as those made 
available to EAPC nations, but are 
adapted to meet the specific needs 
of the ANSF. The emphasis will be 
placed on capacity development and 
implementation of good practices at 
the central and sub-national levels. 12
A Pragmatic Approach on 
the Way Forward
In taking this work forward, maximum 
use will be made of existing NATO/
PfP tools, procedures, and resources, 
including the expertise of the BI 
Implementing Partners. Education and 
professional development are critical 
parts of the BI Tool Kit. In addition 
to mainstreaming efforts described 
above, efforts in 2011-2013 will focus on 
developing an enhanced BI Tool Kit.
Significant progress has been made 
with regards to the development 
of a BI network of Implementing 
Partners as well as a pool of BI SMEs. 
Strengthening the pool of experts 
and reinforcing the network of BI 
Implementing Partners further will 
provide the foundation for a sustained 
effort to transfer knowledge and build 
capacity in the EAPC and Afghanistan. 
A tailored program to build Integrity 
and reduce risk of corruption in the 
ANSF is currently being developed. 
To support it, work will continue to 
improve knowledge of the impact of 
corruption on NATO-led operations 
and to develop practical tools aimed at 
reducing the risk of corruption  
in contracting. 13
Representatives from NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT) listen during the 
keynote addresses.
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Welcoming Remarks
Dr. Leonard Ferrari, Vice President 
and Provost of the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) welcomed participants to 
the 2011 Building Integrity Conference. 
Dr. Ferrari introduced the role of 
NPS as the designated United States 
Partnership for Peace Training and 
Education Center (USPTC). In this 
capacity, NPS offers a “contribution to 
NATO” by developing and leveraging 
programs that support U.S. interests 
in furthering NATO’s Education for 
Reform Initiative, expand Partnership 
for Peace (PfP) initiatives, and extend 
U.S./NATO Defense Institution 
Building (DIB) efforts.
He highlighted some key international 
topics of interest from the various 
Schools and Centers across campus, 
such as: the role of women in 
security and stability efforts for DIB; 
interagency strategic collaboration 
and leadership in complex 
environments; building institutional 
and organizational integrity; and 
diminishing corruption and graft.
As the USPTC, NPS supports 
NATO/partner and U.S. “capacity 
building” efforts on a global basis by 
supporting Combatant Command 
(COCOM) engagement, deploying 
Mobile Education and Training Teams 
(METTs), and conducting bi-lateral 
projects in support of NATO, Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and 
partner country goals and objectives.
Furthermore, the USPTC is building 
additional partnerships with the 
NATO School, University of Geneva, 
and the Geneva Centre for Security 
Policy (GCSP) as well as educational 
institutions in Bahrain, Egypt, India, 
and Jordan.
NPS conducts international courses, 
workshops, and seminars in areas, 
such as: Maritime Security, Cyber 
Security, Military Information Support 
Operations, Energy Security, and 
Senior Level Interagency Seminars 
focusing on Global Interactions.
Dr. Ferrari concluded by saying that 
NPS “recognizes that globalization has 
brought new challenges that appear 
to be beyond the ability of the current 
institutions to address as separate 
entities. Therefore, there is a need to 
generate new research and educational 
opportunities on a global basis and 
to explore more partnership-oriented 
solutions to contemporary threats  
and risks.” 
Dr. Leonard Ferrari, NPS Vice President and 
Provost, introduced the role of NPS as the 
designated United States Partnership for Peace 
Training and Education Center (USPTC).
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Keynote Addresses
The role of Building Integrity (BI) 
in promoting stability and security 
in NATO and partner countries 
was underlined by all three keynote 
speakers:
• General Stéphane Abrial,  
Supreme Allied Commander 
Transformation (SACT)
• Dr. Huguette Labelle,  
Chair of the Board of Directors,  
Transparency International
• Sir Stewart Eldon, former United 
Kingdom Ambassador to NATO
General Stéphane Abrial, 
Supreme Allied Commander 
Transformation (SACT)
General Abrial emphasized that the 
2011 Building Integrity Conference 
“fully reflects the NATO vision outlined 
in the Lisbon Summit Declaration  
in November 2010 and the new 
Strategic Concept.”
His remarks focused on what the 
military can bring to BI – but also on 
how BI and promoting accountability 
can help bring about the secure 
environments that the militaries strive 
to achieve wherever they are engaged. 
It is of the utmost importance that 
all the military forces be held to the 
highest standards of probity and 
honesty. That is part of the military 
code of honor in all nations, and at a 
more concrete level it is an important 
component of the armed forces’ 
training. At the same time, building 
integrity, strengthening transparency, 
increasing accountability, and reducing 
corruption risks should be fully taken 
into account in the military’s mission 
and in planning and conduct by 
commanders. He underlined that the 
military commanders increasingly 
need to take into account aspects 
that, not long ago, would have been 
deemed outside of the scope of purely 
military action. And this implies that 
the military can and should bring its 
contribution to the common purpose 
of Building Integrity.
BI is a “true partnership tool, designed 
and implemented in a cooperative 
way. Building Integrity is not about 
NATO giving lessons to everyone else 
on how to combat corruption. It is 
about partners coming together, on 
an equal footing, to devise concrete 
ways to advance transparency and 
accountability and reduce the risk of 
corruption in defense establishments,” 
noted General Abrial.
Pictured left to right: Sir Stewart Eldon, Former 
United Kingdom Ambassador to NATO; Vice 
Adm. Philip M. Quast (U.S. Navy, Retired), 
NPS USPTC Program Office Senior Fellow; 
Gen. Stéphane Abrial, NATO Supreme Allied 
Commander Transformation (SACT); and Dr. 
Huguette Labelle, Transparency International 
Chair of the Board of Directors.
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So far, both NATO and partner 
countries have made use of some of 
these concrete tools, such as the Self-
Assessment Survey and the associated 
peer review.
More than that, the BI Initiative has 
integrated from the outset a wide 
array of organizations, ranging from 
non-profit organizations such as 
Transparency International (TI) to 
internationally recognized think 
tanks such as Geneva Centre for the 
Democratic Control of the Armed 
Forces (DCAF), and Partnership for 
Peace Training Centers (PTCs), such as 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). 
The perspectives and very concrete 
help provided by the implementing 
partners are invaluable and reflect the 
cooperative dimension of the Alliance’s 
programs endorsed in NATO’s new 
Strategic Concept. 
Allied Command Transformation 
(ACT) has fully embraced this spirit 
of partnership, both in its support 
for BI and in its broader work to help 
make the comprehensive approach 
operational. This begins in the area 
of training, aiming at disseminating 
the best practices in the area of 
transparency and accountability. Lately, 
ACT has reviewed the accreditation 
procedure for courses in order to allow 
more openness for partners. As a 
result, NATO is now in a position to 
accredit any course, even developed by 
non-NATO entities, that responds to 
the needs of NATO, its members, and 
its partners. And, as a highlight, the 
Defense Leadership in Building Integrity 
Course, developed in cooperation with 
TI, is one of the first courses accredited 
through this new procedure. The 
training efforts need to reach beyond 
this course, and if BI is to be a truly 
operational tool, it needs to find its 
full place at the core of training, which 
also involves efforts to train indigenous 
forces. 
NATO’s Training Mission in Afghanistan 
(NTM-A) is a good example of this, as 
one of its core objectives is to transform 
the Afghan National Police from a 
security force to a rule of law force, with 
a particular emphasis on integrity. This 
kind of institution building involves a 
considerable commitment in terms 
of manpower and resources, and it 
can only be effective if anti-corruption 
strategies and practices are properly 
taught and implemented.
General Abrial noted that the focus of 
the phase two of the BI on Afghanistan 
is “a shift in gear for the initiative, 
but certainly a necessary one.” 
Furthermore, he sees the need for the 
Integrity-related issues to be factored 
in from the planning phase in military 
operations. That is, obviously, not 
always easy, and it takes a detailed 
knowledge of a society’s usages and 
actors to implement effectively an 
anti-corruption strategy for defense 
establishments, and even more for a 
whole country. 
The General continued by saying 
that Building Integrity in defense 
establishment efforts can only 
be effective in a theater such as 
Afghanistan if they are seen as part 
of wider anti-corruption efforts led 
by an effective partnership between 
the international community and 
the authorities of the host nation. 
This means applying a genuine 
Comprehensive Approach for all 
anti-corruption efforts. To achieve 
this, the international community 
should get better at coordinating aid 
and having procurement processes in 
place that promote local ownership, 
accountability, and transparency. The 
comprehensive approach to building 
integrity should also encompass 
industry partners as ethics and 
corporate responsibility have become 
increasingly important in the way 
business is conducted. He said ACT 
has a long-standing relationship with 
defense industry stakeholders and can 
assist in raising awareness on integrity-
related issues at ACT-sponsored events 
such as the annual Industry Day.
Awareness of the need for transparency 
and accountability and on the ways to 
fight corruption needs to be constantly 
raised together with much broader 
outreach effort that explains what 
the current building integrity efforts 
are. Therefore, there is a need for 
increasing awareness on the various 
national initiatives that are ongoing in 
the anti-corruption area. This could 
be done through an online anti-
corruption knowledge management 
portal that would be initially made 
available to personnel from all nations 
deployed in the field. This portal could 
Gen. Stéphane Abrial, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT), delivers his 
keynote on “Promoting Stability and Security through Building Integrity and Effective Partnerships.”
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contain links to the relevant national 
resources on building integrity and 
fighting corruption, and information, 
questions, and answers provided 
by the BI implementing partners, 
notably the NGOs. ACT has gained 
some experience in setting up these 
types of platforms, notably through 
its Civil-Military Fusion Center/Civil-
Military Overview experimentation that 
was launched in 2008, and has been 
providing excellent support to military 
and civilian efforts across the globe, 
and could assist in the creation of such 
a resource, if useful.
“Building integrity rests above all on a 
mindset. It is therefore, by definition, 
a long-term endeavor, whose results 
can only be felt over time. But I am 
convinced that if we want to promote 
security, stability and peace – and this 
is, after all, what the NATO Alliance 
is about – initiatives such as Building 
Integrity need to remain at the top of 
our agenda,” concluded General Abrial.
Dr. Huguette Labelle, 
Chair of the Board of 
Directors, Transparency 
International
Dr. Huguette Labelle’s speech focused 
on three themes as the BI Initiative 
transitions into a capability that is 
a mainstream and regular part of 
NATO structures: 1) corruption can 
be tackled successfully, 2) the need to 
mainstream resources and processes, 
and 3) emphasize and integrate BI’s 
contribution to Afghanistan.
“The challenge is to scale up this work 
from being a great foundation to being 
part of the mainstream structures of 
NATO,” said Dr. Labelle during the 
opening of her speech. 
Corruption can be tackled successfully, 
and TI has played a major role in 
making this happen, as it is constantly 
raising awareness of corruption as a 
major problem. 
“… Nations, companies and specific 
sectors of society can and do succeed 
in tackling corruption,” underlined Dr. 
Labelle. Countries as diverse as Turkey, 
Ghana, and Poland show significant 
progress in control of corruption 
during the last ten years as shown by 
the World Bank Governance metrics.” 
(See Image A) “Also, some countries 
that have experienced major conflict 
such as Serbia, Georgia, Colombia, or 
Rwanda have shown great progress 
in curbing corruption.” (Image B) 
The fact that corruption rates have 
dropped in tough and unpromising 
environments is very relevant to the 
situation in Afghanistan. Corruption in 
defense and security is a major issue, 
and TI ‘typology’ shows 29 different 
risk areas that may be encountered in 
defense and security organizations, 
ranging from those of a political nature, 
to personnel, to finance and operations 
areas, to procurement. (Image C)
Image A
Image B
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“It is possible for NATO to engage 
successfully with NGOs to help 
advance the Building Integrity agenda,” 
said Dr. Labelle.
Counter-corruption initiatives need 
resources and integration into the 
mainstream if they are to succeed. 
Even though there is real progress in 
tackling corruption in many countries 
and sectors of society, the landscape 
is sometimes littered with failures. The 
three main reasons for these failures 
are: 1) political will and/or public 
support is often not sustained, 2) many 
initiatives start off being too ambitious 
and/or ill thought out, and 3) there is 
poor management and integration 
of the overall program. Insufficient 
funds, people’s unwillingness to risk 
their careers, and difficulty to work 
across the many organizational and 
national boundaries might endanger 
the change needed to accommodate 
the new counter-corruption measures. 
A sustainable BI effort would require 
NATO to give BI a priority, allocate 
sufficient funds, and dedicate staff to 
work on the Initiative.
Dr. Labelle also expressed her concern 
that even though NATO accredited a 
five-day course, there is slow progress 
in integrating BI tools and processes 
into mainstream NATO. She was 
confident that the conference will be 
able to put into action the modification 
of formal NATO structures to bring BI 
into the mainstream of NATO activity, 
following the decisions taken by NATO 
leaders at the Lisbon Summit.
BI has vital application in Afghanistan 
and in conflict environments, and it is 
important that International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) commanders 
understand the issue of corruption 
in-theatre and that their plans include 
counter-corruption elements. Dr. 
Labelle underlined that nations and 
ISAF need to be much more attentive 
to the effects of the large flows of 
money that come with international 
military interventions. How the money 
is spent actively impacts the success 
of the campaign, as General David H. 
Petraeus, Commander of ISAF/United 
States Forces-Afghanistan, stated 
in his Counter-Insurgency (COIN) 
Contracting Guidance. 14 “Intelligent 
direction of contracting should build 
local capability and popular support 
rather than the reverse, which plays 
into the hands of the insurgency…. 
Furthermore, in the coming transition 
phase, the transition and re-integration 
negotiations must include a framework 
for considering corruption issues in the 
country and their impact on the long-
term outcome,” stated Dr. Labelle.
The work that BI is doing in counter-
corruption training of ANSF senior 
personnel is outstanding, but 
more attention needs to be put on 
developing structures that ensure the 
safety of the subject matter experts, 
such as TI, that deploy to Afghanistan 
on behalf of the NATO BI Initiative. 
Dr. Labelle underlined that at a 
practical level, the BI Initiative needs 
to be scaled up to be a NATO Center 
of Excellence in tackling corruption in 
intervention situations like Afghanistan, 
as well as in nations in more normal 
circumstances; and that NATO must 
show its faith in this new competence 
by building capability and this Center of 
Excellence.
Concluding, Dr. Labelle noted that 
NATO’s cooperation with TI has been 
a tremendous success so far and is 
delivering world-class tools to tackle 
corruption, yet, much more needs to be 
done to make the transition from being 
an excellent foundation to becoming 
part of mainstream structures in 
NATO.
Sir Stewart Eldon, 
former United Kingdom 
Ambassador to NATO
Ambassador Eldon began his remarks 
by noting how the BI Initiative has 
grown from a small initiative into 
a larger process that is gaining 
momentum within the Alliance and – 
significantly – within the Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council (EAPC). 
Ambassador Eldon stated, “Even 
though the Building Integrity 
program has not yet achieved the 
mainstream status it should, I think 
the transformational impact of 
work against corruption in defense 
and security is now increasingly 
recognized.” 
Image C
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Since 2009, BI’s self-assessment 
process has gathered momentum 
and maturity as government officials 
recognize that addressing corruption 
issues is in their own self-interest in 
terms of the health of their defense 
institutions – and of saving money. The 
counter-corruption work in countries 
such as Ukraine and Bulgaria has 
received impetus from higher political 
levels within the National Security 
Council and Ministry of Defense 
(MOD). Furthermore, new NATO 
members such as Croatia receive 
substantial assistance from old NATO 
allies such as Norway. Lately, the 
British Army has made pre-deployment 
training in corruption issues an 
enduring operational requirement for 
deployments to Afghanistan. NATO’s 
strategic level also understands the 
importance of the topic, especially 
when dealing with military operations 
such as the one in Afghanistan.
Ambassador Eldon underlined that 
corruption is central to issues such 
as governance, institution building, 
the rule of law, and the economy that 
governments and the international 
community face today. Therefore, 
counter-corruption work in the 
defense and security sectors can have 
a disproportionately positive impact 
in tackling those issues even when 
force (or the threat of it) is not directly 
involved. 
Lately, a series of conferences being 
organized jointly in London by TI, the 
Royal United Services Institute, and 
the Konrad Adenauer Foundation on 
Transition in Afghanistan showed very 
clearly that effective counter-corruption 
work is going to be a key enabler for 
progress in governance; the rule of 
law; the delivery of the basic public 
services that are so essential to lasting 
stability; and long-term economic 
development. In conflict and post-
conflict environments like Afghanistan, 
the army and police are fundamental to 
this process. They can lead by example 
and spread good practice to other parts 
of government. And they can also make 
an example of corrupt individuals who 
seek to subvert the process.
The links between corruption and 
organized crime are of increasing 
concern to law enforcement agencies, 
state security, and financial bodies, all 
of which require a more comprehensive 
approach to tackling these difficult 
issues. 
Civil society’s role in BI will also play an 
important role in the near future, and 
this starts to become more and more 
recognized in public forums. 
“BI constitutes, to put it bluntly, world 
best practice in its field…I hope that 
telling the story will help resolve some 
of the resource and mainstreaming 
problems. I hope also that making BI 
more accessible will encourage other 
governments and organizations to 
take advantage of the accumulated 
experience and expertise it represents. 
…We should look too at how we 
can work better with other security 
organizations, including the UN, EU, 
and African Union. BI and all it implies 
could be a very significant strand of 
practical cooperation,” concluded 
Ambassador Eldon.
Keynote speakers Dr. Huguette Labelle, Transparency International Chair of the Board of Directors, 
and Sir Stewart Eldon, Former United Kingdom Ambassador to NATO.
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Expert Session
Building Integrity: A 
Case Study of Defense 
Acquisition, Procurement, 
and Contracting in 
Afghanistan
Perspective from the Field 
The Expert Session on Defense 
Acquisition, Procurement, and 
Contracting in Afghanistan began 
with a ‘Perspective from the Field’ 
from Brigadier General (BG) Herbert 
R. McMaster, Commander of 
Combined Joint Interagency Task 
Force – Shafafiyat (Transparency), 
International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) Headquarters (HQ), Kabul, 
Afghanistan and some useful insights 
on the fight against corruption in 
Afghanistan from Lieutenant Colonel 
(LTC) Mark Haywood, UK Army, based 
on his work as Chief CJ4 of Regional 
Command South RC(S), November 
2009-November 2010.
BG McMaster underlined from 
the very beginning that ISAF and 
Government of the Islamic Republic 
of Afghanistan (GIRoA) developed a 
common understanding of the threat 
from corruption, which consists of 
three different elements. First, both 
parties recognized that the level of 
corruption in Afghanistan presents a 
threat to the national security of the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, as 
corruption subverts state functions and 
the rule of law; fuels the insurgency and 
criminal organizations; undermines 
popular support for the Afghan state 
and government institutions; discredits 
and weakens the government and 
security forces; and weakens support of 
the international community. Second, 
it is acknowledged that anti-corruption 
efforts in Afghanistan are hindered 
more by a lack of political will than by a 
lack of capacity. And third, both parties 
are aware that criminal patronage 
networks create barriers to economic 
growth and rob the state of revenue, 
thereby decreasing political capability of 
positive actors.
He mentioned that the Anti-Corruption 
Concept was developed in close 
coordination with Afghan leaders 
and members of the international 
community and aims at focusing on 
corruption that threatens the viability of 
the Afghan state; improving contracting 
and development assistance; and 
prosecuting and sanctioning of 
individuals, networks, and entities (e.g. 
businesses). The concept grounds anti-
corruption efforts in an understanding 
of Afghan politics, influences key 
stakeholders in state weakness to 
support improved transparency and 
accountability, strengthens “islands 
of integrity,” connects positive actors, 
and promotes a culture of lawfulness. 
Finally, it internationalizes anti-
corruption and counter-narcotics 
efforts and emphasizes transparency 
and cooperation.
Furthermore, BG McMaster 
noted that on 8 September 2010, 
Commander International Security 
Assistance Force (COMISAF) released 
Counterinsurgency (COIN) Contracting 
Guidance to underscore the need to link 
contracting to a winning COIN strategy. 
He underlined that scale of contracting 
efforts in Afghanistan represents 
both an opportunity and a danger and 
international forces must be better 
“If there is a final paradox 
in counterinsurgency, it is 
that logistic postures and 
practices are a major part 
of the effort and may well 
determine the operation’s 
success”
–U.S. Field Manual 3-24     
  (Counterinsurgency)
“There is a problem of 
corruption in Afghanistan, 
both in the Afghan 
government and in the 
manner the international 
community gives us 
assistance, contracts, 
subcontracts, and the lack 
of transparency. Those are 
the problems that we are 
facing. And those are the 
problems that we should 
handle on the Afghan side 
by me, by our government, 
by the Afghan people, and 
on the international side 
by our partners.”
–H.E. President Hamid Karzai,  
  11 October 2010
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buyers and buy from better people; 
they should know those with whom 
they are contracting, hire Afghans, 
buy Afghan products, build Afghan 
capacity, develop new partnerships, 
invest in oversight, enforce contract 
requirements, and integrate contracting 
with intelligence, plans, and operations.
He explained that expanding the Afghan 
First Policy is a priority, and so far 79% 
of defense contracts were awarded to 
Afghan vendors (6,262 contracts valued 
at over $500M), who benefitted from 
training to meet contract requirements. 
Moreover, workshops developed for 
Afghan contractors provide information 
on U.S. business practices and 
understanding solicitations, provide 
solicitations to each attendee, explain 
the construction concept and methods, 
show contractors potential project sites, 
and explain specifics of each facility.
Concluding, BG McMaster noted 
that the key to success is to work 
with key Afghan leaders and 
institutions to improve information 
and understanding, implement 
COIN contracting, influence positive 
and negative actors, integrate law 
enforcement and military efforts, 
internationalize counternarcotics 
and anti-corruption efforts, and 
institutionalize reforms.
LTC Haywood then shared his 
experience in Afghanistan by explaining 
that the fight against corruption exists 
along a spectrum of activities, which 
seems to be bounded by a higher-
level target – the culture of impunity. 
This is relevant to the behavior of the 
international community, the Afghan 
community, and upon the foundations 
of effective contract management. 
Money flowing amongst organizations 
and entities involved in the business 
of warfare fundamentally shapes the 
nature of the campaign. Amongst the 
progresses in COIN Contracting in RC 
(S) he underlined the COIN Contracting 
Management Board, Afghan–led 
contracting processes, contractor 
management and outreach, and the RC 
(S) Statement of Intent.
Panel Discussion 1: 
Diagnosis and Assessment 
– Are we Ready? 
Determining Defense 
Institution Capabilities in 
Acquisition, Procurement 
and Contracting
This panel was led by Mr. Mark Dankel, 
NPS, and featured Dr. Rene Rendon, 
Associate Professor of Acquisition 
Management, NPS, and Mr. Mark 
Pyman, Transparency International 
(UK).  Some points covered during 
their discussion included best 
practices, such as the Assessment of 
the United States (US) Department of 
Defense (DoD) contracting processes; 
Transparency International (TI) work 
with different nations in determining 
institution capabilities in acquisition; 
and different methodologies to 
assessments related to Building 
Integrity (BI) in military contracting  
and procurement.
The U.S. DoD contracting process 
follows the Contract Management 
Maturity Model (CMMM), which 
addresses three main elements: Key 
Process Areas (KPA), Levels of Process 
Maturity, and process capability 
drivers. KPA of defense procurement 
are organized within three phases: 
Pre-Award (Procurement Planning, 
Solicitation Planning, and Solicitation 
Award); Award (Source Selection), and 
Post-Award (Contract Administration 
and Closeout). There are five different 
Levels of Process Maturity: Ad-Hoc, 
Basic, Structured, Integrated, and 
Optimized, each of them with different 
characteristics. The Optimized level 
is the most complex one, where 
performance metrics are systematically 
used, and Lessons Learned (LL) and 




growth, improving the 
skill-base of the labor 
force, and creating 
more jobs in public and 
private sectors are among 
the major goals of our 
economic policy for this 
year and beyond.”
–H.E. President Hamid Karzai,    
  Afghanistan: The London  
  Conference, January 2010
Mr. Mark Dankel, NPS Research Associate, facilitates the Expert Session.
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best practices are also established.
An analysis of CMMM Assessment 
results is shown in the included Chart 
- Assessment of DoD Contracting 
Process:
There are five main drivers of the 
acquisition, procurement, and 
contracting process: its strength, 
successful results, management 
support, integration, and measurement.
From this theoretical approach of 
contracting, discussions have moved 
into more practical aspects, such as 
tools developed by TI to measure BI. 
TI has developed diagnostic tool 
for defense establishments in the 
form of an Integrity Self Assessment 
Questionnaire (SAQ) that covers eight 
chapters, from democratic control, 
and national anti-corruption laws, to 
procurement and engagement with 
defense companies. Self-Assessment 
is a two-phase process, with a 
completion of the Questionnaire by 
nations as the first step, followed by a 
review visit of the TI team.
Afghanistan is amongst NATO’s 
partner countries that volunteered to 
take the SAQ. Engaging with national 
Ministry of Defense (MOD) leaders 
is critical to the BI process, as TI has 
identified 29 areas of corruption risks in 
defense and security.
Corruption in Afghanistan is caused 
by both the international community 
and weak governance of the country. 
Therefore, a sustainable effort to 
enhance MOD and Ministry of Interior 
(MOI) capacity has to address BI and 
acquisition staff training, as well as 
establishing anti-corruption bodies.
Given the limited local contracting in 
Afghanistan and therefore, minimal 
guidance for military commanders 
on assessing contracts, specialized 
training for contracting in-theatre has 
become a priority for officers who are 
to be deployed in International Security 
Assistance Forces (ISAF). In this regard, 
the recently adopted Counterinsurgency 
(COIN) Contracting Guidance 
underlines, amongst other things, the 
need to exercise responsible contracting 
practices, and to integrate contracting 
into intelligence, plans, and operations.
As a practical example, the UK military 
has introduced BI into pre-deployment 
training at the brigade level and, 
lately, Joint Forces Command (JFC) 
Brunssum did the same for the Key 
Leaders training.
Moreover, there is a developing body of 
BI theatre knowledge or LL that must 
be disseminated as quickly as possible 
to speed up the assessment of the 
impact of corruption in Afghanistan. 
Major corruption risks stemming from 
acquisitions have to be on the radar 
of the Afghan MOD and MOI and 
ISAF (NTM-A and Shafafiyat). NATO 
and partner nations need to make 
the Afghan First Policy more real by 
putting together current knowledge, 
identifying policy changes, and 
improving pre-deployment training of 
commanders and those engaged in 
theatre acquisition.
The U.S. Army TRADOC Analysis 
Center (TRAC), Monterey, offered 
other practical examples on how 
different concepts related to BI are 
tested using modeling and simulation 
(M&S) capabilities. The Center has 
conducted research on corruption in 
Assessment of DoD Contracting Process
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the Irregular Warfare (IW) environment 
and provided analytical support to 
ISAF HQ. The methodology used 
aimed at producing Knowledge, Data, 
and Algorithms (KDA) accounting 
for the effect of corruption on 
institutions and the influence on 
the civilian population’s attitudes 
and behaviors. One example was 
the Cultural Geography (CG) model 
that combines the agents’ narrative 
and associated values, beliefs, and 
interests in Dr. David Kilcullen’s 15 
depiction of the conflict ecosystem. 
These agents are affected by the events 
in the environment. Throughout the 
course of the simulation, the analyst 
can track the perception of the agents 
over time. This transparency allows for 
the detailed analysis of what events 
were most influential, where these 
events occurred, and what population 
groups were most affected. The agent’s 
actions are governed through scripted 
events as well as the Theory of Planned 
Behavior (TPB). An improvement to 
the CG model for this study was the 
inclusion of reinforced Learning Utility 
Theory, which provides a more realistic 
representation of agent behavior, which 
very simplistically rewards success 
and discourages known failed actions. 
Additional improvements to the model 
will include additional representation 
of influence, corruption, and what 
motivates the population to provide 
Human Intelligence (HUMINT).
When it comes to types of security 
assessment in Afghanistan, multiple 
metrics were considered. Some of 
the metrics used were complex and 
some were very subjective (e.g. local 
population assessment of security). As a 
way ahead when conducting this type of 
research, understanding the complexity 
of the environment, providing the 
military forces with user-friendly 
technology to improve the integrity 
of the information, and leveraging 
operators to develop new technologies 
and gather data should be prerequisites.
Panel Discussion 2: Best 
Practices and Lessons 
Learned. What works? 
What doesn’t?
This panel was led by Dr. Francois 
Melese, Professor of Economics, NPS, 
and featured Lieutenant Commander 
Legena Malan, Civil Engineer Corps, 
US Navy; Commander Cory Yoder (US 
Navy retired), Senior Lecturer, NPS; Mr. 
Max Kidalov, JD, Assistant Professor, 
NPS; and Mr. Adrian Kendry, Head, 
Defence and Security Economics, 
Political Affairs and Security Policy 
Division, NATO Headquarters.  
Some of their focus included Best 
Practices and Lessons Learned (LL) 
from contracting in conflict zones, 
as International Security Assistance 
Force’s (ISAF) contribution to 
Stabilization and Reconstruction (S&R) 
requires contracting in such areas.
Discussions covered the following 
subjects: 
• Counterinsurgency (COIN) Policy
• Reconstruction contracting issues 
and LL
• The Yoder Three Tier Model for 
integrative planning, coordination, 
and execution of forward contracting 
operations and its link with NATO 
Building Integrity Initiative (BII) 
goals, and 
• LL from fraud investigations of US 
Small Business Act Contracting 
Program, and a model for NATO 
COIN Contracting System.
Five of the seven lines of efforts of 
COIN Policy are stability operations 
tasks, such as: establishing civil security 
“Money is ammunition; 
don’t put it in the wrong 
hands. Institute “COIN 
Contracting.” Pay close 
attention to the impact 
of our spending and 
understand who benefits 
from it. And remember, 
we are who we fund. How 
we spend is often more 
important than how much 
we spend.” 
–General David Petraeus,   
  COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency  
  Guidance
Pictured left to right: Mr. Adrian Kendry, NATO Headquarters, Political Affairs and Security Policy 
Division, Defence and Security Economics Head; Dr. Francois Melese, NPS Professor of Economics; 
Lt. Cdr. Legena Malan, U.S. Navy Civil Engineer Corps Officer; Mr. Max Kidalov, JD, NPS Assistant 
Professor; and Cmdr. Cory Yoder (U.S. Navy, Retired), NPS Senior Lecturer.
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and control, supporting governance, 
restoring essential services, supporting 
economic and infrastructure 
development, hosting national security 
forces, and conducting information 
management. Reconstruction 
contracting faces a series of challenges 
related to coordination, the capacity 
to rebuild, the cycle of corruption, 
oversight, local culture, and feedback. 
Poor coordination leads to redundant 
projects, too much or too little 
infrastructure for a region, as well as 
to sustainment issues. The capacity to 
rebuild is endangered by an untrained 
workforce, reporting on progress, or 
material availability. Too much money 
spent too quickly with inadequate 
oversight can create a perverse incentive 
to maintain the status quo of insecurity 
and bad governance. Contracting 
oversight is not just an Afghan issue, 
it is also an issue of different nations 
and agencies involved in reconstruction 
contracting and needs to be regulated 
by national authorities. A lack of 
cultural sensitivity during design and 
reconstruction results in facilities that 
are not only unacceptable to local 
populations, but also unsustainable by 
them. Periodic checks of completed 
projects to see if they are used as 
intended or if they are accepted and 
maintained should be an integrated part 
of contracting. The guiding principle in 
reconstruction, based on contracting 
in Afghanistan in 2007, should be low 
complexity, high durability, and Afghan 
self-sustainability. Implementation of 
LL into new reconstruction projects and 
pursuing Afghan First Policy in selecting 
contractors, workers, and materials 
became priorities.
The Yoder Three Tier Model for 
Integrative Planning, Coordination, 
and Execution of forward Contracting 
Operations, was adopted by, amongst 
others, the Special Inspector General for 
Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR). The model 
is based on three tiers: the Ordering 
Officer (OO), at the tactical level; 
Leveraging Contracting Officer (LCO) at 
the operational level; and the Integrated 
Planner and Executor (IPE) at the 
strategic level. (The last tier is virtually 
non-existent.) Each tier is defined by 
four primary elements: functional 
requirements – position descriptors/
functions; educational level – basic, 
professional, graduate, Joint Professional 
and Multidisciplinary Education (JPME); 
skill sets – experiential factors; and 
personnel and manpower characteristics 
– rank. 
One of the key elements of Phase 
Zero (0) operations is to develop and 
implement a contract integration plan 
that has to be part of the exercise cycle 
for robust authentication.
Well-credentialed structure that 
integrates strategic planning with 
contract capabilities has to be 
harmonized with overall NATO BII goals. 
Furthermore, contracting should not 
be treated as a simple administrative 
function and should be properly 
resourced to get the desired outcomes. 
NATO’s best-optimized model has 
to include oversight at all tiers and 
to emphasize the importance of 
management and auditing functions.
When implementing COIN Contracting 
Guidance, Afghan or Iraq First Policy, 
nations, NATO, and coalition partners 
can use different tools and principles 
to prevent the misuse of funds. Solid 
contracting Acts (e.g. the U.S. Small 
Business Act Contracting) to cover 
eligibility requirements, assistance 
procedures, and different forms of 
controls are amongst the tools. When 
control is failing then investigations 
come into play. Perform periodic 
certifications, review eligibility and 
data collection, and cross reference 
to determine compliance, monitor 
performance, and track contract 
arrangements and benefits are LL for 
COIN contracting.
A couple of recommendations on 
a possible model for NATO COIN 
Contracting System were made  
during discussions:
a. It has to emphasize that poor 
contracting is the “broken window” 
of COIN governance development 
efforts; “Commander’s business” is 
good, but not enough; also define 
exactly who will be responsible for 
what elements
b. It has to create a dedicated 
office that can assume control 
of contractor certifications, 
re-certifications, and timely 
de-certifications of important 
contractor categories (e.g. 
security contractors, local-owned 
firms, etc.), taking into account 
security and rule of law/economic 
Dr. Jack Kem, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan Deputy to the Commander, and Col. Vivian 
Shafer, U.S. Army Reserve Legal Command Training Division Chief.
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development concerns. Self or local 
certifications are not sufficient. 
c. It has to establish multiple channels 
for processing and hearing of 
performance, responsibility, and 
eligibility complaints regarding 
contractors and subcontractors 
as well as government actions. 
(E.g.: records, hotlines for locals, 
contractor certification office)
d. It has to ask up front for sufficient 
information from primes and subs 
regarding ownership, control, 
and reputation. Use site visits, 
documents, data mining, and 
require updates.
e. It has to establish clear standards 
of responsibility tied to security and 
integrity and to place the burden of 
proof back on contractor/subs, and 
not on Contracting Officers. 
f. It has to establish clear ownership, 
control, affiliation, and local 
economic development standards 
for local firms and to monitor 
compliance during contract.
g. It has to consider a user-friendly 
Command-based status/
eligibility/responsibility protest 
or challenge system for locals, 
Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs), and NATO military/
intelligence stakeholders 
h. It has to clearly and timely enforce 
penalties for non-compliance and 
non-cooperation. 
Panel Discussion 3: 
Training and Education 
for Acquisition, 
Procurement and 
Contracting in Defense 
Institutions – Turning 
Policy into Practice
This panel was led by Mr. Mark Dankel, 
NPS, and featured Major Maria Vedder, 
US Army, (TRAC-Monterey); Lieutenant 
Commander Gerald Lowe, Foreign 
Area Officer, US Navy; Commander 
Cory Yoder (US Navy retired), Senior 
Lecturer, NPS; and Dr. Rene Rendon, 
Associate Professor, NPS.  Some 
points for discussion in their panel 
included the Contract Management 
Maturity Model (CMMM) Assessment 
Results and Education and Training 
(E&T), on an overview of a Master 
of Business Administration (MBA) 
Joint Applied Project on Analysis 
of Contemporary Contingency 
Contracting Educational resources, and 
on the required skill sets at the tactical 
level to help determine requirements 
for contracting and procurement.
Panelists noted that Procurement 
and Solicitation Planning, Solicitation, 
Source Selection, Contract 
Administration, and Closeout should 
be part of contracting Education and 
Training (E&T) programs, as they 
describe in detail all the activities 
that need to be accomplished by the 
contracting officer. Lessons Learned 
(LL) and Best Practices should also be 
considered as an integrated activity of 
Contract Closeout, as they are to be 
considered when dealing with  
new contracts.
The Project on the Analysis of 
Contemporary Contingency 
Contracting Educational Resources 
examined fundamental differences 
in educational resources; it utilized 
“Yoder Three-Tier Model (YTTM) for 
Optimal Planning and Execution of 
Contingency Contracting”; it included 
all Department of Defense (DoD) 
contingency contracting course 
Learning Objectives (LOs) and US 
Army Soldier’s Manual of Common 
Tasks; it examined three factors 
influencing preparation of students, 
such as: similarities and differences, 
benefits to targeted audience, and 
whether the course content is in 
harmony with target; and it was 
validated through 1400 test questions 
and software. As already mentioned in 
Panel 2, educational level of each of the 
Tier described in the YTTM is one of 
one the four elements that define each 
of them. The DoD educational assets 
in contingency contracting address 
enlisted, junior officers, civilians, and 
senior level contracting personnel. Each 
DoD and US Army Soldier’s Manual 
of Common Tasks courses’ LOs were 
assessed against a five items scale, 
and the findings showed that: the 
courses were meeting the established 
objectives; intent of each course meets 
the intended target audience; and the 
YTTM is an effective tool for comparing 
educational resources at particular 
proficiency level. The research did 
not determine whether prospective 
students were properly enrolled into 
the correct course, as this was not the 
research intent. 
Four case studies on reconstruction 
projects in Afghanistan were also 
presented and discussed, including one 
on road construction and one on water 
and irrigation canals. They were to 
highlight requisite skill sets for soldiers 
to effectively gather information at 
the tactical level to help determine 
requirements for contracting and 
procurement. Amongst the LL while 
conducting some of the reconstruction 
projects, four are essential for a 
contracting officer: understanding 
labor demographics and the impact 
of distribution of employment to 
create contracts that support the 
Commanders’ mission; knowing the 
operational environment patterns of 
life so reconstruction would not disrupt 
local approaches; making available 
non-traditional supplies through flexible 
procurement; and getting the soldier 
what he needs and when he needs it.
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Plenary Sessions
The Plenary Sessions featured a 
series of panel discussions conducted 
over two days. The Plenary Sessions 
concluded with a roundup of views that 
charted a way forward. 
Panel Discussions
Panel Discussion 1: Building 
Integrity and Reducing the Risk of 
Corruption in Defense Institutions
This panel was chaired by His 
Excellency Mr. Jean- Jacques de Dardel, 
Ambassador, Head of the Mission 
of Switzerland to the Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council, and featured Ms. 
Avgustina Tzvetkova, Deputy Minister 
of Defence, Bulgaria; Mr. Morten 
Tiller, Ministry of Defence, Norway; 
Mr. Maciej Wnuk, Commissioner for 
Anticorruption Procedures to the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Poland; 
and Mr. Viktor Soloviov on behalf of 
Mr. Oleksandr Medvedko, First Deputy 
Secretary, National Security Defence 
Council, Ukraine.  It focused on four 
case studies: 1) Norway’s regulations 
on conflicts of interests, 2) Bulgaria’s 
defense reform, 3) Polish experience on 
Building Integrity in Defense, 
 and 4) current Ukrainian Building 
Integrity efforts.   
The panel began with discussions 
on Norway’s national regulations on 
conflicts of interest. In order to ensure 
the integrity of defense institutions, it 
is important to identify and eliminate 
conflicts of interest when dealing with 
defense acquisition. This is important 
for all senior leaders or members 
of different boards (e.g. tendering), 
and for all uniformed and civilian 
officials who may have the opportunity 
to influence decision-making. It is 
unacceptable in Norway defense 
institutions, for example, to be a board 
member or have ownership interests 
when assessing offers from suppliers, 
or to participate in competitions or sign 
procurement contract with the defense 
sector. Codes of conduct are a useful 
tool for preventing conflict of  
interest, and other regulations may 
define obligations related to the 
military establishments.
Bulgaria has made significant progress 
in defense reform and building integrity 
over the past twenty years. At the 
beginning of the reform process, the 
country was seriously challenged 
by corruption practices at different 
levels of government and the lack of 
transparency in the decision making 
process of defense procurement. 
Pictured left to right: Col. Ed Lesnowicz 
(U.S. Marine Corps, Retired), NPS Research 
Associate; Col Mark Baines, NATO School 
Commandant; and Mr. Tom Hazard, NPS 
USPTC Program Director.
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At the Ministry of Defense (MOD) 
level, a series of actions were taken in 
order to implement reforms, such as: 
the creation of a Permanent Council on 
Anti-corruption Policy by the Defense 
Minister; approval of an Action Plan on 
Anti-Corruption; changes in the Law 
on Defense and Armed Forces; internal 
audits of the defense contracts; use 
of external independent observers; 
publication of the reports on the 
implementation of anti-corruption 
measures; and engagement with Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
when developing a methodology 
for assessing the MOD corruption 
environment. At the same time, 
Bulgaria improved the mechanisms for 
control over the implementation and 
results of the defense policy. Some of 
the lessons learned from the Bulgarian 
case included: the concept that not 
following best practices in defense 
management has led to different public 
scandals, a clear legal framework is 
needed to support the change, and 
strong public support and external 
political pressure are important drivers 
of the process. 
The third case study was presented 
by Poland. In 2005, Poland started to 
build a “culture of integrity” within the 
defense establishment. Even though 
there were many departments and 
offices involved in anti-corruption 
activities within the MOD, there was no 
coordination among them, insufficient 
anti-corruption measures, and lack of 
an integrity policy. New anti-corruption 
bodies were created, with the mission 
to improve procedures for integrity 
and efficiencies (e.g. Anti-corruption 
Procedures Bureau - APB), and, based 
on priorities, the MOD has started to 
tackle corruption using a top-down 
approach. Moreover, the MOD started 
the procurement reform process, with 
Transparency International assistance 
on Defense Integrity Pact, and on 
different pilot programs, and having 
the APB supervise key points of the 
defense acquisition process. In order 
to prevent conflicts of interest, a Code 
of Conduct for military and civilian 
personnel in relationship with the 
defense industry was also adopted by 
the MOD. Lessons learned from the 
Polish experience can be summed up 
as follows: use the momentum for high 
political will to introduce substantial 
reforms; make a strategy based on 
priorities; leverage existing tools and 
mechanisms (e.g. Self Assessment 
Questionnaire, BI training); change 
procedures first and then make 
personnel changes; dedicate staff to 
carry out the change; learn from best 
practices; and engage with people  
or institutions from outside the  
defense sector. 
The fourth case study was Ukraine, 
which has made excellent progress 
in implementing many of the 
prerequisites for reducing corruption 
in defense establishment. The 
National Security and Defense Council 
(NSDC) has led the process and is 
supported by different departments 
and agencies. Ratification of the 
international legislation on corruption, 
including the UN Convention against 
Corruption, and adoption of national 
anti-corruption laws were amongst the 
first steps considered by the Ukrainian 
government. Ukraine also joined 
different international anti-corruption 
bodies under the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and 
Development and European Union 
frameworks and investigated different 
corruption cases. Ukraine joined the 
BI Initiative in 2008. To date it has 
one of the highest attendance rates to 
BI courses and it has conducted two 
SAQs. Furthermore, Ukraine delivered 
its first nationally developed BI course, 
and is interested in enhancing its 
cooperation with more international 
organizations or other countries, in 
order to exchange best practices.
Panel Discussion 2: Understanding 
Corruption in Conflict 
Environments
This panel was chaired by Ambassador 
Jan Lucas van Hoorn, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands, and 
featured Ms. Francesca Recanatini, 
Senior Economist, World Bank; Dr. 
Binyam Solomon, Team Leader, 
Defence Economics Team, Defence 
Research and Development Canada, 
Center for Operational Research and 
Analysis, National Defence; and Dr. 
Robert McNab, Associate Professor of 
Economics, NPS.  Its focus included 
the following topics: links between 
corruption and conflict; the World Bank 
experience in assessing corruption 
challenges in post-conflict countries; 
and Lessons Learned (LL) from the 
Dr. Rene Rendon, NPS Associate Professor of Acquisition Management.
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United Nations (UN) and Canadian 
Peacekeeping Mission in Haiti.
According to Transparency 
International’s (TI) Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI), countries 
experiencing or emerging from 
conflict are among the most corrupt 
(e.g. Afghanistan and Iraq). A conflict 
economy, coupled with weak state 
institutions, results in pervasive 
corruption, which in turn leads to 
impunity, representing an incentive 
for further conflict and corruption. 
Therefore, improving state institutions 
is key in reducing corruption and 
attenuating the incentives for conflict, 
and it should reduce the propensity 
of public employees to be corrupt. 
When talking about improving state 
institutions, Rule of Law, social norms, 
and behavioral rules have to be taken 
into consideration. Uncertainty during 
conflicts has a negative influence on 
the social norms, and individuals seek 
to engage with those from the same 
tribe, race, religion, etc., thus creating 
incentive for corruption, represented by 
private returns. 
Corruption, poor delivery of services, 
and weak investment climate are 
consequences of weak or bad 
governance. There are numerous 
challenges posed by post-conflict 
environments such as political crises 
and high levels of insecurity, poverty 
and weak economies, weak state 
institutions that are unable to provide 
basic services, ineffective watchdog 
agencies, poorly managed and 
ineffective security sector, disputed 
government legitimacy and low social 
capital, social polarization potentially 
causing grievances and violence, 
regional instability and possible 
presence of displaced populations,  
high rates of unemployment and 
under-employment, and high 
expectations for the donor community 
and the Government to deliver quick, 
visible results. In this context, any 
assessment of governance should 
address identification of obstacles, 
vulnerability of each institution, and 
identification of priorities. 
Governance Diagnostic Surveys are 
participatory processes to identify 
governance challenges and build local 
capacity. Three surveys conducted 
by the World Bank on households, 
firms, and public officials in different 
post-conflict countries 16 between 
2003 – 2005, showed that over 80% 
of the citizens used bribes to obtain 
public services, and almost the same 
percent of public officials reported 
frequent purchase of positions in their 
institutions. Some lessons learned 
from the World Bank assessment 
can be summed up as follows: global 
measurement tools and national 
assessments should complement 
each other; countries as well as 
international donors and organizations 
can be involved in measurement; 
one advantage of the approach is the 
greater local capacity, consensus, 
and ownership that can ensure 
sustainability of reform process; the 
disadvantages are that the assessment 
is time-consuming and costly, and 
coordination with different actors 
and unforeseen political change are 
challenging. Measurement tools have 
helped shape public sector reforms 
when paired with political will, donor 
coordination, and medium term vision. 
Empirical work done on the UN and 
Canadian Peacekeeping Missions in 
Haiti has shown a huge discrepancy 
between the total expenditure  
($ 324 M) and the estimated amount 
impacting the macro macro economy 
($29 M). At the micro level, corruption 
impacts inflation, labor, occupation, 
and stability. Based on this experience, 
the need for performance measures, 
a finance officer’s strategy, and the 
contracting approaches are some 
lessons that could be applied to 
Afghanistan and other conflict 
countries as well.
Panel Discussion 3: Impact 
of Corruption on Peace and 
Development in Afghanistan 
This panel was chaired by Mr. Urban 
Ahlin, Deputy Chair, Foreign Relations 
Committee Swedish Parliament, and 
featured Mr. Yama Torabi, Director, 
Maj. Maria Vedder, NPS Operations Research Analyst.
“If we accept that cultural 
norms influence economic 
decision, then corruption 
is influenced by cultural 
norms.” 
– Dr. Robert M. McNab, 2011     
   Building Integrity Conference
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Integrity Watch Afghanistan; Mr. 
Valey Arya, Senior Adviser, NATO 
Building Integrity-Afghanistan; and Mr. 
Albert Huntington, Deputy Assistant 
inspector General for Audit, Special 
Inspector General for Afghanistan 
Reconstruction.  Some of the panel’s 
discussion regarding corruption,  
peace, and development in Afghanistan 
is included. 
There are four types of corruption in 
Afghanistan, which are linked to each 
other, with some having systematic 
effects: 1) petty corruption (e.g. 
Baksheesh 17, Rishwat 18, Paysa-e-
tchai Shirini) which is highly frequent 
and has an impact on the income of 
citizens; 2) grand corruption (e.g. fuel, 
land, drugs, construction materials) 
which has larger social implications; 
3) corruption in mining and other 
key economic sectors (e.g. bribes, 
rent-seeking, wasteful exploitation) 
that undermines state revenues and 
development; and 4) corruption in 
aid and foreign money (e.g. bribing of 
officials, taxation by the Taliban) which 
impacts the credibility of international 
community and aid effectiveness. 
Petty corruption has resulted in 
denial of services and hence has an 
impact on development. As shown 
in the Integrity Watch Afghanistan 
(IWA) Survey 2010, households with 
monthly incomes of less than 60 USD 
are the most exposed when it comes 
to households having to pay bribes 
in order to secure the main source 
of their income (small businesses), 
increasing the inequality between rich 
and poor. Petty corruption, totaling 
one billion dollar a year, also has an 
impact on peace and development: 
50% of those facing corruption in 
judiciary circumstances turned to 
non-state actors, including the Taliban, 
to obtain justice; 60% of those facing 
corruption regarding property turned 
to non-state actors, including the 
Taliban, to resolve their land disputes; 
50% consider that corruption in state 
fosters the expansion of the Taliban; 
33% said the Taliban mobilized on the 
basis of corruption allegations in the 
Afghan government; and 33% reported 
corruption caused conflict in their area 
or town.
Grand corruption impacts 
development, as monopolies over 
fuels increases prices, or land grabbing 
by the powerful in commercial areas 
leaves small business owners without 
shops. Furthermore, it leads to 
macroeconomic instability and capital 
flight. It also maintains the conflict, as 
the drug economy is one of the main 
sources of income for insurgency.
Corruption in aid and foreign money 
impacts Afghanistan’s development in 
many ways. The lack of aid oversight 
empowers warlords and serves private 
interests of officials. Uncoordinated 
aid leads to multiple payments for 
the same project or service and, in 
the end, Afghan receive between 5 to 
10 times less services and projects. 
Moreover, it also impacts conflict, as 
transportation, security contracting, 
and infrastructure building are major 
sources of income for insurgents.
Even though mining has some positive 
aspects (e.g. large mines are seen 
as a strategic resource by Afghan 
leadership and as a means to create 
jobs) corruption in this field also 
impacts development and can create 
conflict. The contracts have often been 
Source: IWA Survey 2010
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awarded to warlords; indirect bribes to 
government officials have became a 
source of local rivalries and grievances; 
and sometimes there has been an 
overlap between the businessmen who 
supported the election campaigns and 
those who were awarded contracts.
Actions seen as necessary to achieve 
peace and stability (e.g. co-opting 
war elites and local power holders 
in search for political stability and 
tolerating corruption of war factions 
in early stages of the conflict as a way 
of buying peace) sometimes lead to 
different types of corruption, such as 
political clientelism and nepotism; lack 
of state accountability; land grabbing; 
or impunity of the political elites.
Also, actions seen as development 
(e.g. massive influx of aid; many 
reconstruction and development 
actors; parallel structures, such as 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams; 
private security in the absence of 
state; and provision of public services 
by non-state actors) have led to 
corruption in different forms, including: 
a lack of oversight and control, weak 
accountability, lack of transparency, 
bribing of government officials, and 
opportunities for bribe to donors  
or Taliban.
IWA is currently using a community-
based monitoring process. This 
monitoring process has an impact 
on fighting corruption, by informing 
donors on the impact of their work, by 
building credibility of citizens’ actions, 
and by offering an alternative to 
warlords at the local level. 
Panel Discussion 4: NATO’s 
Contribution to Building Integrity 
and Reducing the Risk of 
Corruption in Afghan National 
Security Forces 
This panel was chaired by Lieutenant 
General Jürgen Bornemann, Director 
General, International Military Staff, 
NATO Headquarters, and featured 
Dr. Jack D. Kem, Deputy to the 
Commander, NATO Training Mission, 
Afghanistan / Combined Security 
Transition Command, Afghanistan; 
Brigadier General Michael Jorgensen, 
NATO Allied Headquarters Joint 
Force Command, Brunssum; and Ms. 
Susan Pond, Senior Officer, Defence 
and Security Economics, Political 
Affairs and Security Policy Division, 
NATO Headquarters.  Some of the 
discussions focused on the Building 
Integrity support for Afghanistan in 
the form of both building integrity and 
reducing the risk of corruption in the 
Afghan National Security Forces and 
providing pre-deployment training on 
BI for ISAF personnel.
At the NATO Lisbon Summit, 19-
20 November 2010, NATO and the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan agreed on an “Enduring 
Partnership,” which emphasizes 
NATO’s long-term commitment and 
support for Afghanistan. 
The main BI elements of this “Enduring 
Partnership” are as follows: develop 
a BI action plan for the Ministry of 
Defense (MOD) and Ministry of 
Interior (MOI); build Afghan capacity 
to support implementation, drawing 
on replies to BI Self Assessment 
Questionnaire; develop an Afghan BI 
Centre for Good Governance at the 
National Security University; embed 
BI into the program of instruction at 
training and education institutions 
by reviewing the NTMA catalogue 
of courses; and adapt BI tools and 
mechanisms to provide practical 
support to ANSF by continuing to 
conduct BI courses. 
One of the NATO Joint Force 
Command (JFC) Brunssum’s key tasks 
is to ensure that NATO forces stay 
within the mandate given by United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions 
(UNSCR) or through the decisions 
of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). 
UN SCRs 1890 and 1943 both call 
for “further efforts by the Afghan 
Government to fight corruption, 
promote transparency and increase its 
accountability.” The fact that so much 
effort is now being directed at fighting 
corruption reflects the recognition that 
corruption is one of the key obstacles 
to building government legitimacy 
through the trust of the Afghan 
people for their government. Without 
a legitimate government the ISAF 
mission is virtually unachievable.
JFC Brunssum’s involvement with 
BI started in November 2009 with a 
meeting at NATO Headquarters (HQ) 
Ms. Susan Pond, NATO Headquarters, Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, Defence 
and Security Economics Senior Officer
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to determine how this command 
could support the Initiative. Following 
this meeting, Brunssum hosted a BI 
workshop in April 2010. This led to 
Brunssum becoming a regular member 
of the BI Steering Group. Brunssum has 
since introduced BI and anti-corruption 
into NATO led ISAF Pre-deployment 
Training. Key Leaders from HQ ISAF/
IJC/NTM-A and Regional Commands 
(RCs) discuss the topics during their 
Key Leader Training Courses at JFC 
Brunssum and in theatre.
Contracting and procurement are 
also key areas for Brunssum, and 
the command has made use of the 
databases of a number of agencies 
and NGOs to help identify Afghan 
capabilities and the companies 
within Afghanistan that it wishes to 
do business with. Consequently, the 
contracts that Brunssum awards have 
become more anti-corruption focused. 
In order to fill the gap between the 
tactical activities in theatre to support 
the identification and prosecution of 
existing corruption and the work being 
done by higher commands, Brunssum 
created a new annex to the Operational 
Plan that would bridge the gap between 
strategic guidance and tactical action. 
It developed Annex TT to address 
the specific issue of corruption, and 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
(SACEUR) approved it in January 2011. 
The Annex places local corruption as 
the highest priority, as this directly 
impacts the population and will 
damage the relationship between 
the Afghan population and the 
government, which, in turn, will make 
it difficult for ISAF to complete its 
mission successfully. 
Panel Discussion 5: Strengthening 
Transparency & Accountability – 
What Can Be Done? 
This panel was chaired by Ms. Susan 
Pond, Senior Officer, Defence and 
Security Economics, Political Affairs 
and Security Policy Division, NATO 
Headquarters, and featured Ms. 
Salome Shapakidze, Head of the 
Euro-Atlantic Integration Co-ordination 
Department, Office of the State 
Minister of Georgia on European and 
Euro-Atlantic Integration; Dr. Albert C. 
Pierce, Director, Institute for National 
Security Ethics and Leadership, 
National Defense University, USA; 
and Mr. Dominique Lamoureux, 
Vice President, Ethics & Corporate 
Responsibility, Thales.  Some of the 
panel discussions focused on Common 
Industry Standards (CIS) and Georgia’s 
experience with strengthening 
transparency and accountability.
The European CIS is a proactive 
initiative from European industry. 
Launched in 2006, and adopted by 
more than 400 European companies, 
it represents a set of shared tools 
for preventing corruption, such as 
comprehensive procedures and 
a practical toolkit. A CIS update 
is underway that seeks to have a 
worldwide audience. The intention 
of this broader initiative is to force all 
exporting companies to abide by the 
same “non-corruption” standards 
and develop an authentic ‘”level 
playing field,” to help companies 
resist extortion through collective 
approaches and by sharing 
information, and to demonstrate 
that international companies operate 
with high ethical standards. Thus 
far, some achievements have been 
reached, such as the production of 
the Global Principles of Business 
Ethics, the decision to organize an 
international forum, and endorsement 
of the AeroSpace and Defense (ASD) 19 
Convention. Global Principles of 
Business Ethics are continuously 
updated to address the changing 
ethical environment. The International 
Forum on Business Ethical Conduct 
(IFBEC) facilitates best practices 
exchange between companies and 
encourages interaction with major 
stakeholders in business ethics, while 
convincing governments to stop buying 
from countries that have not adopted 
similar rules. Two meetings took place 
in 2010, and another one is planned 
for May 2011. Compliance with national 
corruption regulations is no longer 
sufficient due to market globalization 
and the global trend for companies 
is to self-regulate their business, 
following international ethics codes. At 
the moment, supply companies only 
enforce preventing corruption, and 
companies continue to face extortion 
under the “demand”-side pressure.
Fighting against corruption in Georgia 
represents a comprehensive and 
complex approach that implied 
amongst others: establishing the 
rule of law, downsizing the state 
administration, and public awareness 
campaigns to lower corruption. As 
a result, the cases of corruption 
decreased and Georgia is perceived as 
“less corrupt than most former Soviet 
republics.” 20  Furthermore, the public 
attitude and perception towards the 
government has changed and it is 
now more positive. According to the 
Global Corruption Barometer Survey by 
TI, only 3% of respondents have said 
that they had to pay a bribe, one of the 
lowest rates found.
Georgia’s Anticorruption Strategy 
and Action Plan 2010-2013 addresses 
corruption-sensitive areas, such as: 
modernization of public service; 
development of administrative service 
and state procurement; reform of 
the public finance system, tax, and 
customs systems; enhancing justice 
administration; improving financing 
of political parties; and increasing 
interagency coordination.
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Working Groups
In the afternoon of the second day of the 
conference, participants broke out into 
five parallel working groups that analyzed 
different elements of the Building 
Integrity Initiative and the BI Tool Kit. 
Participants in each group were asked to 
prepare practical recommendations on 
the way ahead. 
Working Group 1: 
Development of Building 
Integrity Guidance and 
Doctrine for Training and 
Education 
Working Group (WG) 1 considered the 
development of Building Integrity (BI) 
guidance and a doctrine to support 
training and education. 
The WG started with four short 
briefings on the following topics: 1) 
the Allied Command Transformation 
(ACT) training development process 
and the new procedure for course 
accreditation; 2) an overview and 
current state of BI education and 
training activities, with an emphasis 
on challenges posed by financial 
constraints on further developing such 
activities; 3) UK Defense Academy 
experience with Key Leaders training, 
Mobilization Readiness Training, and 
other pre-deployment courses with 
an emphasis on the need to develop a 
BI training doctrine; and 4) Ukraine’s 
achievements in BI.
Discussions focused on four main 
topics: the need for developing a BI 
training doctrine; flexibility of the new 
NATO accreditation process; new 
BI courses; and funding for Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
willing to send students for training.
While it was clear that there was 
no doctrine to support BI training 
development and that such doctrine 
was required, it was unclear as to 
whether developing a standalone 
doctrine was the only way of achieving 
this goal or if BI should be incorporated 
into existing NATO documents. Some 
participants noted that BI doctrinal 
elements could be included in existing 
documents, policies, or guidance, 
such as the Comprehensive Approach 
(CA), the Counterinsurgency (COIN) 
Doctrine, or the Peacekeeping Doctrine 
and NATO might want to consider 
developing a capability within these 
frameworks, as opposed to developing 
separate BI doctrine. Other participants 
suggested that a BI Code of Conduct 
would also be very beneficial for partner 
nations.
What was clear was that the aims of 
BI should be maintained at all levels 
from NATO HQ to the command and 
individual levels. This would require 
active management and support with 
strong political, internal, and external 
communication. Moreover it was 
critical that the bi concept should be 
well resourced if it impetus was to be 
maintained. 
BI represents a capability that needs 
to be developed, as does any other 
capability. This could be achieved 
by NATO itself undergoing a self-
assessment to determine how well 
prepared NATO is to deliver BI into  
the future.
The new ACT accreditation process 
of courses enables NATO’s adoption 
of courses from any source. A survey 
could usefully result in adoption of 
courses from European union (EU), 
United Nations (UN), and other 
international sources. 
Following successful hosting of BI 
courses, Peace Support Operations 
Training Centre (PSOTC) of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (BiH) saw the need 
to train Senior Non-Commissioned 
Officers (SNCOs) in BI to support 
their work on the front lines, where 
they often operate independently. An 
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understanding of BI best practices 
would enhance their work. The course 
is based on experience with SNCOs in 
Helmand province in Afghanistan and 
on the Bi – Strategic (Bi-Sc) Guidance 
on NCO Development. PSOTC is keen 
to share and cooperate in the delivery of 
these courses.
NGOs are an important part of the 
training audience for BI courses and 
participants addressed the need 
for NATO Headquarters (HQ) to 
develop mechanisms to increase their 
participation and funding as part of a 
standard procedure. 
Some conclusions were drawn from 
the session. First, BI goes beyond 
the scope of military action, and 
therefore requires a comprehensive 
approach in order to be implemented 
effectively. There is a need for sustained 
political will within NATO and beyond 
to continue BI, and ensure that the 
necessary expertise and resources will 
be available in the long term. Finally, 
enhancing BI subject matter expertise 
within NATO structures and within 
Allied and partner nations is a key part 
of a way ahead.
NATO has to determine how to deal 
with the identified need for BI Doctrine 
and BI should be included in capability 
development process.
Working Group 2: 
Developing Tools for 
Nations to Measure 
Change
Working Group 2 was tasked to discuss 
the development of specific tools for 
nations to measure change in building 
integrity. The proposed approach was 
presented in a PowerPoint presentation 
by TI and Norway, and this approach 
was very much supported.
Participants noted that “Integrity” is 
still a difficult term to use by different 
nations and that it might be changed 
without changing its meaning. They 
underlined that several of the major 
allies need to participate in the BI 
Initiative or this will remain a marginal 
activity for NATO. Additionally, the 
invitation for partnering in the BI 
Initiative should extend beyond the 
EAPC nations, i.e. to Mediterranean 
Dialogue (MD), Istanbul Cooperation 
Initiative (ICI) countries, and  
Global Partners.
Several representatives from nations 
suggested that the BI Initiative should 
have a stronger focus on procurement, 
efficiency, and effectiveness. Others 
said that there was already too much 
focus on procurement and there should 
be more focus on Human Resources 
(HR) processes and on logistics.
There were some good discussions on 
methodology. Could there be synergy 
with other survey activities (e.g., 
UNCAC, GRECO, DPP)? Also some 
commented on other experience with 
similar methodologies, where the score 
could decrease on repetition as greater 
experience is gained with the tool.
The feedback review meeting by NATO 
was seen as an important benefit of 
the self-assessment process. It was 
also suggested that even with this self-
assessment methodology, it could be 
combined with NATO feedback.
On the project plan, there was a 
view that the methodology, being 
based on the SAQ, was already pretty 
strong and there was little need for 
an ad-hoc committee at this stage. TI 
did not agree, as nations supporting 
the initiative were important to 
demonstrate interest and commitment, 
and to develop understanding as  
it progressed.
The working group made the following 
recommendations: 1) developing tools 
for nations to measure change is a valid 
project and should move forward and 
2) NATO’s full range of partner nations 
should be invited to attend from an 
early stage.
Working Group 3: 




Working Group 3 met to discuss 
challenges and ideas for research 
pertaining to corruption and conflict. 
Most of the discussions centered 
on Afghanistan. Participants noted 
that the overwhelming inflows of 
military and development aid created 
unprecedented levels of corruption 
without comparable historical cases. 
On a more general level, the discussion 
also addressed the terminology 
and understanding of corruption, 
noting the lack of common lexicon 
for “corruption.” Corruption is 
multi-dimensional and needs to be 
contextualized. Although corruption 
seems not to be cultural, there are 
national differences. 
On data collection in conflict areas, 
census data is often not available and 
it is difficult to develop a representative 
sample for research. Baseline data 
is often questionable and field case 
studies are rarely done in conjunction 
with perception and survey data. The 
lack of consistency in surveys makes it 
difficult to produce longitudinal results 
and track results over time. Moreover, 
there is duplication of efforts. For 
example in Afghanistan, the same 
research is commonly being undertaken 
by many entities. Because the surveys 
are expensive, duplicative efforts fuel 
corruption and, after a while, returns 
begin to diminish. 
There are several types of studies on 
corruption that are available, including 
cross-national comparisons, national 
surveys, and records of institutional 
missions and incidents. Transparency 
International (TI) and World Bank 
studies and indices, inter alia, are 
acceptable baselines that do not need 
to be “reinvented” for Building Integrity 
research initiatives.
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For particular cases, however, further 
research on the underlying risks, gains, 
and losses of corruption are needed.  
An increased understanding of the 
incentives to corrupt and the incentives 
to act with integrity is needed. 
In Afghanistan, there is a paradox: 
How can a country built around honor, 
pride, and respect be so corrupt? A 
deeper understanding of Afghan goals 
and desires with regard to fighting 
corruption is required.
Corruption is, without a doubt, the 
most pressing issue in Afghanistan. 
It is endemic and opportunistic and 
extends from local levels to provincial 
and national levels. In the past year, 
Afghans paid out $2.5 billion in bribes 
and kickbacks—the equivalent of 23 
percent of the country’s gross domestic 
product. 21  The largest sectors for 
graft are critical social services such as 
health and education.  
In Afghanistan, corruption drivers 
include, but are not limited to, the 
magnitude of the funding flows and 
the lack of capacity to implement 
and monitor programs. There are 
not enough laws focused on fighting 
corruption, and often there is a lack of 
personnel trained to enforce existing 
ones. Forty percent of the funding 
flows are in the budget cycle and 
easier to monitor, while sixty per cent 
are out of the budget cycle. Hawala 22  
effectively prohibits Western corruption 
investigators to trace money flows. 
The WG proposed several 
recommendations for BI research 
initiatives and stressed that the 
research be applied research, designed 
to produce practical outcomes. 
The recommendations for areas where 
further research is most urgently 
needed are as follows: 1) a comparative 
study on conflict areas, the nature of 
international support, or stabilization 
efforts and international financial 
flows; 2) the correlations of reduction 
of corruption and representation of 
women in administrative and political 
processes; 3) measuring the impact of 
corruption on conflict as well as the 
impact of conflict on corruption; 4) 
assessing national contracting practices 
for applicability to Afghanistan and 
other nations in conflict; 5) assessing 
corruption in conflict areas through 
disaggregation of types and costs 
of corruption; and 6) the extent to 
which the level of corruption is linked 
to the length of international military 
engagement.
Research initiatives specific to the 
Afghanistan context are as follows: 1) 
explore potential positive and negative 
incentives (internal and external) to 
demonstrate to political leadership 
that it is in their self-interest not to be 
corrupt; 2) assess changes in attitudes 
toward corruption and assess job 
opportunities using two case studies 
in education: American University in 
Kabul (with foreign-trained teachers) 
and Kabul University (Afghan faculty 
members); 3) explore strategic 
communications, more commonly 
known as public awareness campaigns, 
oriented towards ordinary people and 
their role in building integrity; 4) explore 
policy options to bring informal sectors 
of the economy, the most corrupt, into 
the formal sector; 5) explore policy 
options to give young men legitimate 
livelihood options as employed young 
men are less likely to participate in 
informal corrupt economic sectors and 





Capabilities in the Afghan 
National Security Forces
Working Group (WG) 4 discussed 
how to strengthen transparency, 
accountability, and capabilities  
of the Afghan National Security  
Forces (ANSF).
Participants were provided an overview 
of Building Integrity work in support 
of Afghanistan. Although the BI 
Initiative is an anti-corruption program, 
it focuses on reducing corruption 
risk through training and practical 
reforms, not through enforcement 
and prosecution. The aim is to help 
nations meet the requirements of the 
UN Convention against Corruption, 
focusing on the defense and security 
sector. NATO is also working to train its 
own forces before their deployment to 
Afghanistan.
The BI Initiative was initially part of 
the Afghanistan Cooperation Program 
(ACP). In 2008, two Afghan officers 
attended the BI course at NATO 
School. To date, six courses, plus a 
Senior Leaders Day, have taken place 
in Afghanistan. Out of the nearly 400 
students who have taken part in BI 
courses, half have been Afghans. 
Now, BI is part of the Enduring 
Partnership Agreement signed by the 
Afghan President and NATO Secretary 
General, and since 2010, BI has worked 
together with NATO Training Mission 
in Afghanistan (NTM-A). NATO is 
currently developing a proposal for a 
multiyear program to support all ranks 
and levels of the ANSF. 
Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD) 
and Ministry of Interior (MOI) have 
completed the Self Assessment 
Questionnaire (SAQs) and the process 
is being taken further through the 
peer review process. It was noted that 
the Self Assessment Questionnaire 
(SAQ) process is an enabling one. The 
possibility of civilian sector involvement 
was discussed.
Moreover, NATO is working with 
NTM-A to review courses and 
incorporate BI into the existing training 
modules. A core team of Afghan experts 
and trainers will be set up as part of the 
“Afghanization” process. Another, very 
ambitious element of the program, is 
the incorporation of the initiative into 
the Afghan National Security University. 
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In addition, Codes of Conduct and 
Ethics are being developed for Afghan 
National Army (ANA) and Afghan 
National Police (ANP).
The focus is on the two ministries that 
can be the engines of change, and 
the emphasis should reach beyond 
2015. There have been preliminary 
discussions with the World Bank, which 
has a number of similar efforts ongoing 
in other ministries and which has 
expressed an interest in cooperating 
with NATO on BI. In the working group 
discussions, reference was also made to 
professional military education, gender, 
and literacy programs. 
Participants agreed that BI should 
have a ten-year scope. The will of the 
international community to develop 
this program is an opportunity. 
Furthermore, BI complements 
Shafafiyat at ISAF. 23 
Different models in which the army 
identifies itself with the population 
can be used in the Afghan context. 
Even though such developments take 
time, it has been noted that the Afghan 
army and, to a lesser degree the police, 
currently enjoy the trust of the people. 
This should be further developed. A 
notable success would be to increase 
the rank of Afghanistan in the TI 
corruption perception index by 10. 
The working group recommended that 
the BI ANSF proposal should be further 
developed with a ten-year horizon in 
mind. Nations should be informed how 
to contribute funding. NATO needs to 
make sure that steps are taken soon to 
maintain momentum.
Working Group 5: 
Reducing the Risk of 
Corruption in Operational 
Contracting
Working Group (WG) 5 met to make 
practical recommendations that could 
assist contracting officers working in 
complex operational environments. 
Much of the discussion centered on 
Afghanistan and how the Building 
Integrity Initiative could support 
Commander International Security 
Assistance Force (COMISAF)’s “Afghan 
First” guidance. 24
The WG opened with a discussion of 
the Better Business Tool Kit (BBTK) 
being developed in support of “Afghan 
First.” Key elements of the BBTK 
include pre-deployment training, 
support in-theatre, and an impact and 
lessons learned assessment.
WG discussions focused on the 
problem of corruption and contracting, 
data availability for rotating contracting 
officers, and training.
Most procurement takes place under 
national rules, not NATO regulations. 
NATO common funding is marginal 
compared to what ISAF nations spend 
in Afghanistan. Therefore, focus on 
NATO alone would exclude half of 
the ISAF contributors. Procedures are 
the best way to fight corruption. The 
problem in Afghanistan is a culture of 
corruption on a grand scale. Making 
changes in ISAF contracting procedures 
does not address that but can 
contribute to wider efforts to reduce 
corruption in the country.
Time pressure and complex 
contingencies have an effect on 
procurement and complicate the 
decision making of procurement 
officers in Afghanistan. Consequently, 
the key elements for reducing 
corruption are preventive controls, 
detection, and prosecution. The 
group noted that frequent rotation of 
contracting officers is considered a fact 
of life in Afghanistan and the loss of 
continuity is problematic. A web portal 
or other mechanism that would allow 
validation of prices and tracking of poor-
performing contractors and suppliers 
would allow less-experienced officers 
to benefit from past experiences. 
Furthermore, reinforced use of existing 
common contracting databases, the 
implementation of P-4 guidance25, 
and formalization of the feedback loop 
would ensure that lessons are not 
lost. The burden of providing correct 
information on, for example, ownership 
and principal managers should be 
on the company, not the contracting 
officer. General Abrial spoke of ACT’s 
help in establishing a web portal; this 
initiative could benefit contracting 
officers as well.
Establishing common elements 
for certification/accreditation of 
contracting officers within NATO is 
important and individuals (both civilian 
and military) should be trained in the 
specific roles of contracting (award, 
quality assurance, etc.). Training does 
not have to be elaborate or formal to 
be useful. For example, the Contracting 
Officer’s Representative (COR) course 
is a short online module that does not 
require class time. 
Setting clear requirements is a key to 
successful contracting. Accordingly, 
training should focus on those who 
set requirements. However, setting 
requirements is beyond the scope of 
the BI Initiative. COR training at virtually 
every location would be useful. 
The WG made the following 
recommendations: 1) reinforce the 
plans for further use of existing 
NATO databases (CIDNE/NDURE) to 
capture and share information among 
contracting officers from the various 
NATO/ISAF entities, nations, and 
organizations; and 2) develop training 
at all levels to increase awareness 
of contracting-related corruption. 
Forms of training could include online 
modules or inclusion of BI material 
into the existing training. The training 
should be addressed to all actors with 
linkages to contracting in theatre, up to 
the commander level.
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Way Forward and  
Next Steps
In the last day of the Building Integrity 
(BI) Conference, participants took 
stock on the progress made during the 
conference in defining the way ahead 
and determining the next steps in 
implementing the BI Initiative.
It was concluded that the Conference 
met its objectives, due in part to the 
fact that it utilized a comprehensive 
view  that included strategic, political, 
and theoretical approaches to BI. 
Interesting theoretical models in 
contracting were offered as examples, 
and tools, such as simulation, that  
need to be used to test these models 
were featured.
Furthermore, the case studies, coming 
either from national or international 
experiences, brought together lessons 
learned and best practices that will 
further help NATO and nations in  
the actual implementation of the  
BI Initiative.
Representatives from NATO 
Headquarters (HQ) and commands, 
together with those from Transparency 
International (TI) UK, and other 
senior level participants representing 
BI implementing partners, delivered 
key messages participants were 
encouraged to consider and take 
actions on when back to their capitals 
or institutions.
These key messages are as follows:
• Keep BI visible and transparent at 
the NATO HQ level 
• Build a political constituency for BI 
and debate it at the proper political 
level in national capitals
• NATO should define where to create 
BI capabilities in its structures and 
policies 
• Preserve BI external component, 
i.e. the network of implementing 
partners 
• Enhance BI subject matter expertise 
• Develop relevant research to support 
change management
• Focus on Afghanistan and other 
countries in equal shares
• Tailor training for the Afghan 
National Security Forces, as 
Afghanistan represents a priority for 
NATO
• Develop strategic communications 
plan for Afghanistan and elsewhere 
and tell the story
• Encourage nations to contribute 
with resources to help further 
implementation of the project
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07:00 – 07:45 
Continental Breakfast Buffet 
Location: Monterey Plaza Hotel, 
Cypress Ballroom
EXPERT SESSION
Building Integrity: A Case Study of 
Defense Acquisition, Procurement & 
Contracting In Afghanistan
Location: Monterey Plaza Hotel, 
Dolphins Ballroom
08:00 – 08:15 
Welcoming Remarks: Dr. Leonard 
Ferrari, Vice President and Provost, 
Naval Postgraduate School 
08:15 – 09:00 
Perspective from the Field: Brigadier 
General Herbert R. McMaster, 
Commander, Combined Joint 
Interagency Task Force-Shafafiyat 
(Transparency), at ISAF Headquarters, 
Kabul, Afghanistan
09:00 – 09:30 
Break
09:30 – 10:00 
Procurement Challenges in 
Transitions: Lieutenant Colonel Marc 
Haywood, UK Army
10:00 – 12:00 
Panel Discussion 1: Diagnosis 
and Assessment – Are We Ready? 
Determining Defense Institution 
Capabilities in Acquisition, Procurement 
and Contracting 
Led by Mr. Mark Dankel, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Dr. Rene Rendon, 
Associate Professor of Acquisition 
Management, Naval Postgraduate 
School; Mr. Mark Pyman, Transparency 
International (UK)
12:00 – 13:00 
Buffet Lunch 
Location: Monterey Plaza Hotel, Upper 
Plaza (al fresco)
13:00 – 15:00 
Panel Discussion 2: Best Practices & 
Lessons Learned – What Works? What 
Doesn’t?
Led by Dr. Francois Melese, Professor 
of Economics, Naval Postgraduate 
School; Lieutenant Commander 
Legena Malan, Civil Engineer Corps, 
US Navy; Commander Cory Yoder 
(US Navy retired), Senior Lecturer, 
Naval Postgraduate School; Mr. Max 
Kidalov, JD, Assistant Professor, 
Naval Postgraduate School; Mr. 
Adrian Kendry, Head, Defence and 
Security Economics, Political Affairs 
and Security Policy Division, NATO 
Headquarters 
15:00 – 15:15 
Break
15:15 – 16:30 
Panel Discussion 3: Training 
& Education for Acquisition, 
Procurement and Contracting in 
Defense Institutions – Turning Policy 
into Practice
Led by Mark Dankel, Naval 
Postgraduate School; Major Maria 
Vedder, US Army, (TRAC-Monterey); 
Lieutenant Commander Gerald 
Lowe, Foreign Area Officer, US 
Navy; Commander Cory Yoder (US 
Navy retired), Senior Lecturer, Naval 
Postgraduate School; Dr. Rene 
Rendon, Associate Professor, Naval 
Postgraduate School 
End of Expert Session
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17:00 – 17:30 
Preparation Session (Conference 
Speakers and Panel Moderators 
Location: Monterey Plaza Hotel, 
Dolphins Ballroom
19:00 – 21:00 
Opening Reception
Location: Monterey Plaza Hotel, Upper 
Plaza (al fresco) 
Thursday, 24 
February 2011 
08:00 – 08.45 
Continental Breakfast Buffet 
Location: Monterey Plaza Hotel, 
Cypress Ballroom
PLENARY SESSIONS
Location: Monterey Plaza Hotel, 
Dolphins Ballroom
09:00 – 09:15 
Welcoming Remarks 
Vice Admiral Philip M. Quast (Retired), 
Senior Fellow, Naval Postgraduate 
School 
09:15 – 10:15 
Keynote Addresses 
• General Stéphane Abrial, Supreme 
Allied Commander Transformation, 
NATO  
“Promoting Stability and Security 
through Building Integrity and 
Effective Partnerships”
• Dr. Huguette Labelle, Chair of the 
Board of Directors, Transparency 
International  
“From foundation to structure: the 
hardest part”
• Sir Stewart Eldon, Former United 
Kingdom Ambassador to NATO 
“The Strategic Significance of 
Building Integrity”
10:15 – 11:00 
Media Availability and Coffee break 
11:00 – 12:15 
Panel Discussion 1: “Building Integrity 
and Reducing the Risk of Corruption in 
Defence Institutions”
• Ms. Avgustina Tzvetkova, Deputy 
Minister of Defence, Bulgaria
• Mr. Morten Tiller, Ministry of 
Defence, Norway
• Mr. Maciej Wnuk, Commissioner for 
Anticorruption Procedures to the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Poland
• Mr. Viktor Soloviov on behalf of Mr. 
Oleksandr Medvedko, First Deputy 
Secretary, National Security Defence 
Council, Ukraine
Chaired by His Excellency Mr. Jean-
Jacques de Dardel, Ambassador, Head 
of the Mission of Switzerland to the 
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 
12:15 – 13:30 
Buffet Lunch  
Location: Monterey Plaza Hotel, Upper 
Plaza (al fresco)
13:30 – 15:00 
Panel Discussion 2: “Understanding 
Corruption in Conflict Environments”
• Ms. Francesca Recanatini, Senior 
Economist, World Bank
• Dr. Binyam Solomon, Team Leader, 
Defence Economics Team, Defence 
Research and Development Canada, 
Center for Operational Research and 
Analysis, National Defence
• Dr. Robert McNab, Associate 
Professor of Economics, Naval 
Postgraduate School
Chaired by Ambassador Jan Lucas van 
Hoorn, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The 
Netherlands
15:00 – 15:30 
Break
15:30 – 17:00 
Parallel Working Groups 
Each Working Group will be invited 
to examine a topic. Discussions will 
focus on developing a way forward and 
identifying 2-3 recommendations that 
could be taken up for action as part of 
the BI Initiative. (The WG leads have 
been asked to prepare a 1 page note 
as guidance to frame discussions; it 
should include 2-3 recommendations 
to be reviewed in the WG. These will 
be presented as a package in plenary 
session.) 
Working Group 1:  
“Development of BI Guidance 
and Doctrine for Training and 
Education”
Led by: 
• Brigadier General Theodosios 
Dourouklis (Greece), Assistant Chief 
of Staff Joint Education Training & 
Exercises, NATO Allied Command 
Transformation, NATO 
• Air Commodore Alan Waldron 
(Retired), Transparency International, 
(UK)
• Wing Commander John Bleeker, 
Defence Academy, UK
Working Group 2:  
“Developing Tools for Nations to 
Measure Change”
Led by: 
• Mr. Mark Pyman, UK Defence Team, 
Transparency International
• Mr. Per Fewang, Ministry of Defence, 
Norway
Working Group 3:  
“Understanding the Links between 
Corruption and Conflict- Research 
Priorities”
Led by: 
• Mr. Carl-Einar Stalvant, Swedish 
National Defence Academy
• Dr. Michael J. Baranick, Institute for 
National Strategic Studies, National 
Defense University, USA
Working Group 4: “Strengthening 
Transparency, Accountability and 




Panel Discussion 3 “Impact 
of Corruption on Peace and 
Development in Afghanistan” 
• Mr. Yama Torabi, Director, Integrity 
Watch Afghanistan
• Mr. Valey Arya, Senior Adviser, 
NATO Building Integrity-Afghanistan
• Mr. Albert Huntington, Deputy 
Assistant inspector General for 
Audit, Special Inspector General for 
Afghanistan Reconstruction
Chaired by Mr. Urban Ahlin, Deputy 





Panel Discussion 4: “NATO’s 
Contribution to Building Integrity and 
Reducing the Risk of Corruption in 
Afghan National Security Forces”
• Dr. Jack D. Kem, Deputy to the 
Commander, NATO Training 
Mission, Afghanistan / Combined 
Security Transition Command, 
Afghanistan
• Brigadier General Michael Jorgensen, 
NATO Allied Headquarters Joint 
Force Command, Brunssum 
• Ms. Susan Pond, Senior Officer, 
Defence and Security Economics, 
Political Affairs and Security Policy 
Division, NATO Headquarters
Chaired by Lieutenant General Jürgen 
Bornemann, Director General, 





Panel Discussion 5: “Strengthening 
Transparency and Accountability – 
What Can Be Done?”
• Ms. Salome Shapakidze, Head 
of the Euro-Atlantic Integration 
Co-ordination Department, Office 
of the State Minister of Georgia 
on European and Euro-Atlantic 
Integration
• Dr. Albert C. Pierce, Director, 
Institute for National Security Ethics 
and Leadership, National Defense 
University, USA
• Mr. Dominique Lamoureux, Vice 
President, Ethics & Corporate 
Responsibility, Thales
Chaired by Ms. Susan Pond, Senior 
Officer, Defence and Security 
Economics, Political Affairs and 
Security Policy Division, NATO 
Headquarters
15:00 – 15:45
Round-up of views: Way Forward and 
Next Steps 
• Mr. Mark Pyman, UK Defence Team, 
Transparency International
• Brigadier General Michael Jorgensen, 
NATO Allied Headquarters Joint 
Force Command, Brunssum
• Brigadier General Theodosios 
Dourouklis (Greece), Assistant Chief 
of Staff Joint Education Training & 
Exercises, NATO Allied Command 
Transformation, NATO 
• Sir Stewart Eldon, Former United 
Kingdom Ambassador to NATO
Chaired by Mr. Adrian Kendry, Head, 
Defence and Security Economics, 
Political Affairs and Security Policy 
Division, NATO Headquarters
15:45 – 16:00
Closing Remarks by NATO and NPS
Led by: 
• Ms. Susan Pond, Senior Officer, 
Defence and Security Economics, 
Political Affairs and Security Policy 
Division, NATO Headquarters
• Mr. Valey Arya, Senior Advisor, 
NATO Building Integrity-Afghanistan
Working Group 5: “Reducing the 
Risk of Corruption in Operational 
Contracting” 
Led by: 
• Dr. Francois Melese, Professor of 
Economics, Naval Postgraduate 
School 
• Ms. Pauliina Törmä, Staff Officer, 
Defence and Security Economics, 
Political Affairs and Security Policy 
Division, NATO Headquarters
17:00 – 17:30 
Review of Working Group 
Recommendations (Working Group 
Leaders with NATO IS)
18:30 
Departure by Bus from Monterey Plaza 
Hotel to the Naval Post Graduate 
School
18:45 – 21:30 
Reception and Dinner at the Naval 
Postgraduate School 
Location: Hermann Hall Quarterdeck 
and McNitt Ballroom
21:45 
Departure by Bus from the Naval 
Postgraduate School to Monterey Plaza 
Hotel
Friday, 25 February 2011
08:00 – 08:45 
Continental Breakfast Buffet 
Location: Monterey Plaza Hotel, 
Monterey Bay Room
PLENARY SESSIONS
Location: Monterey Plaza Hotel, 
Dolphins Ballroom
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Abbreviations and Acronyms
ACO  Allied Command   
 Operations 
ACP Afghanistan    
 Cooperation Program
ACPB Anti-Corruption Procedures  
 Bureau
ACT  Allied Command   
 Transformation 
ANA Afghan National Army
ANP Afghan National Police
ANSF Afghan National Security   
 Forces
ASD AeroSpace and Defense
AU African Union 
BBTK Better Business Toolkit
BG Brigadier General
BI Building Integrity
BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina
BII Building Integrity Initiative
CA Comprehensive Approach
CG Cultural Geography
CIS Common Industry Standards
CJIATF Combined Joint Anti-  
 Corruption Task Force




COR Contracting Officer   
 Representative
CPI Corruption Perception Index
CSTC-A Combined Security Transition  
 Command – Afghanistan
DCAF Geneva Centre for   
 Democratic Control over the  
 Armed Forces
DoD Department of Defense   
 (U.S.)
E&T Education and Training
EAPC Euro-Atlantic Partnership   
 Council
EU European Union
GCSP Geneva Centre for Security   
 Policy
GIRoA Government of the Islamic   
 Republic of Afghanistan
GRECO The Council of Europe’s   





ICI Istanbul Cooperation   
 Initiative
IO International Organization
IPE Integrated Planner and   
 Executor
ISAF International Security   
 Assistance Force
IW Irregular Warfare
IWA Integrity Watch Afghanistan
JFC Joint Forces Command
JPME Joint Professional Military   
 Educationn
KDA Knowledge, Data, Algorithms
KPA Key Performance Area





M&S Modeling and Simulation
MD Mediterranean Dialogue
NATO North Atlantic Treaty   
 Organization
NCO Non-Commissioned Officer
NGO Non-Governmental   
 Organization
NPS Naval Postgraduate School
NSDC National Security and   
 Defense Council
NTM-A NATO Training Mission in   
 Afghanistan
OO Ordering Officer
PAP-DIB Partnership Action Plan on  
 Defense Institution Building
PfP Partnership for Peace
PSOTC Peace Support Operations   
 Training Center
PRT Provincial Reconstruction   
 Team
PTC PfP Training and Education  
 Centre
RACVIAC Regional Arms Control   
 Verification and Assistance  
 Centre
RC (S) Regional Command South
S&R Stabilization and   
 Reconstruction
SAQ Self Assessment   
 Questionnaire
SC Strategic Command
SEEGROUP South-East Europe Group
SIGIR Special Inspector General for  
 Iraq Reconstruction
SME Subject Matter Expert
SNCO Senior Non-Commissioned  
 Officer
SSR Security Sector Reform
TI Transparency International
TPB Theory of Planned Behavior
TRAC TRADOC Analysis Center




UNDOC United Nations Office on   
 Drugs and Crime
WB World Bank
YTTM Yoder Three Tier Model
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Frequently Asked 
Questions
What is the Building 
Integrity Initiative? 
The NATO Building Integrity (BI) 
Initiative aims “to raise awareness, 
promote good practice and provide 
practical tools to help nations build 
integrity and reduce risks of corruption 
in the security sector by strengthening 
transparency and accountability.” 26
Why is building integrity 
important?
Transparent public institutions that 
are free of corruption help to sustain 
security and stability of a state and 
provide citizens an accountable 
government. This is especially 
important in states going through 
difficult transitions from conflict to 
peace where the public regard for 
government is low. 
For defense ministries in particular, 
building integrity “leads to an increased 
level of trust in the armed forces, 
minimizes the potential for violations 
in procurement and other areas of 
defense management, and saves 
money thought fighting inefficiencies. 
Ultimately, the largest benefits for 
senior officers are the positive effects 
that this has on the quality of military 
effectiveness and in raising trust in the 
armed forces.” 27
Who can participate in the 
NATO Building Integrity 
Initiative? 
All NATO Allied and partner nations 
may participate in the BI Initiative. As 
part of the process, the government of 
the participating country consults with 
NATO in the development of a tailored 
action plan. 
Who implements the 
Building Integrity 
Initiative? 
The NATO Defense and Security 
Economics Directorate of NATO’s 
Political Affairs and Security Policy 
Division manage the BII. Experts from 
a network of partners contribute to the 
initiative, including 28: 




Geneva Centre for Security Policy 
www.gcsp.ch
Geneva Centre for Democratic Control 
of the Armed Forces 
www.dcaf.ch
Integrity Watch Afghanistan  
www.iwaweb.org




UK Defense Academy 
www.da.mod.uk
Swedish National Defense College 
www.fhs.se
Ministry of Defense of Bulgaria   
www.md.government.bg
Ministry of Defense of Norway 
www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fd.html
Partnership for Peace Education 
& Training Centre in Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
www.psotc.org
Partnership for Peace Education & 
Training Centre in Turkey 
www.bioem.tsk.tr
United States Partnership for Peace 
Education & Training Centre 
www.nps.edu/usptc




November 2007 – The Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council (EAPC) launched 
the Building Integrity Initiative (BII).
Phase I (2007-2010) – Focused on 
the development of tools – a self-
assessment survey, peer review 
process, and a best practices hand 
book – for participating countries 
to increase transparency and fight 
corruption.
2008
April 2008 – NATO Summit Bucharest: 
Heads of State and Government 
asserted, “we will give priority to 
several new practical initiatives, which 
include building integrity in defence 
institutions” (para 32) 
July 2008 – BI Trust Fund is created 
with voluntary contributions from 
Poland, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom
2009
Beginning in 2009 – Tailored courses 
held in Afghanistan and Ukraine 
February 2009 – International 
Conference on Building Integrity, 
Monterey, California yielded the 
Monterey Recommendations: (1)
• Strengthening Integrity in Theater
• Strengthening Integrity through 
Education
• Strengthening Integrity in 
Procurement
• Strengthening Integrity through 
Research and Analysis
April 2009 – NATO 60th Anniversary 
Summit: Heads of State and 
Government encouraged the EAPC to 
“further develop the Building Integrity 
Imitative which promotes transparency 
and accountability in the defence sector 
and report back to us on this initiative 
at our next Summit”
2010
Beginning in 2010 – BI featured in 
Key Leaders Training at Joint Forces 
Command (JFC) Brunssum 
April 2010 – Completion of Phase I with 
the publication of “Building Integrity 
and Reducing Corruption in Defence: 
A Compendium of Best Practices” 
presented by NATO and Switzerland *
May 2010 – Phase II launched with 
focus on enhancing the BI Tool Kit 
including: 
• More tailored education packages, 
including e-based tools
• An expanded pool of subject matter 
experts to support implementation
• A Risk Assessment Tool
• An Integrity Index to supplement the 
current Integrity Self Assessment 
Survey
• An Integrity Pact for procurement
• Practical tools to support NATO led 
operations (2)
October 2010 – Defense Leadership 
in Building Integrity Course held at 
the NATO School, Oberammergau, as 
NATO Pilot Course
November 2010 – Course accreditation 
by Allied Command Transformation 
(ACT)
November 2010 – Further 
implementing BII endorsed by 
the NATO Heads of State and 
Governments at the Lisbon Summit 
2011
February 2011 – Second Building 
Integrity Conference, Monterey, 
California
May 2011 – Defense Leadership in 
Building Integrity Course to be held at 
Partnership for Peace Training Centre 
(PTC) Turkey
October/November 2011 – Defense 
Leadership in Building Integrity 
Course to be held at the NATO School, 
Oberammergau
references:
(1) “Building Integrity and Reducing 
Corruption in Defence: A Compendium 
of Best Practices” p 28-29
(2)  http://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natolive/news_63991.htm 
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